APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 32 Oil, Politics, and Conflict in the Niger Delta: A Nonkilling Analysis Fidelis Allen and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike A dominant feature of the discourse on the Niger Delta is the role oil plays in politics and conflict in the region. Oil revenue is a motivating factor for the posture of the political class at the national level and is implicated as a cause of violence during elections and in ongoing violence and killings in the delta. Applying Glenn D. Paige’s nonkilling political analytical tool to Nigeria’s current situation indicates that oil-related killing in the Niger Delta is the result of a lack of vision of nonkilling leadership and politics by the state and non-state actors. Only a nonkilling approach to governance and the politics of oil production and distribution of benefits, however, can bring lasting solutions to the conflict in the delta between local justice and environmental groups confronting the actions of the federal government and oil companies. OIL WAS DISCOVERED IN COMMERCIAL QUANTITIES IN 1956 in Oloibiri, in present-day Bayelsa state. The first shipment for export occurred in 1958. The discovery and exploitation of petroleum put the spotlight on Nigeria as a prospective wealthy nation, because it was expected that oil would transform it into a developed country. Since that time, however, oil has become an overriding element in analyses of underdevelopment and conflict in the Niger Delta region.1 One part of the discourse on the link between oil and conflict in the region criminalises violent activities of members of the local community and environmental rights and justice groups. Another simplistically points to self-serving materialism as a core motivational element among key political and economic actors, that is, the Nigerian state and western corporate interests.2 Conflictive relationships pitting local justice 1. The Niger Delta is understood here as the nine Nigerian states where oil is exploited: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers. Scientific and geographical definitions limit the region to a few core states, namely, Bayelsa, Cross River, and Rivers, which are defined by common vegetation. 2. See John Agbonifo, ‘Oil, insecurity and subversive patriots in the Niger Delta: The Ogoni as agent of revolutionary change’, Journal of Third World Studies, 26:2 (2009), 71–106. Fidelis Allen is a lecturer in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria. His research interests include peace and conflict, democracy, development, and environmental and identity politics. Ufo Okeke-Uzodike is a professor of political science and head of the School of Politics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Scottsville, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 3:2 (2010), 32–42. © 2010 University for Peace Africa Programme. All rights reserved. ISSN 1659–3944.