APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 80 80 AFRICA PEACE AND CONFLICT JOURNAL Electoral violence can result from fragility in the state caused by the destruction of political, social, and economic structures of governance or unfairness stemming from inequalities. Vigilantism, which has plagued Kenyan society for more than a decade, is one example of what can happen when institutional systems break down.20 Violence perpetrated in furtherance of establishing, maintaining, and re-creating a sociopolitical order is sometimes carried out by police officers on duty or involved in extralegal violence, such as membership in death squads (in extreme cases).21 In some instances, state officials desperately seeking to restore eroded legitimacy encourage the communal lynching of suspects and other forms of violence. Dialectical violence can be alleviated or eliminated by altering the unstable situation or environment. Clashes over land during 1992 and 1997–1998 and the electoral violence of 2007–2008 were characterized by divisive ideologies of ethnicity, regionalism, and sometimes religion. The 2002 and 2007 elections were regarded by youths as ‘a platform for peaceful management of social conflict’.22 To some, youth involvement in the 2002 electoral process had added to the possibility of defeating an ineffective KANU government. The failure of the Kibaki-led NARC government to live up to expectations disappointed the youth constituency, perhaps contributing to the 2007–2008 violence. THE 2007 BALLOTING On the eve of the 2007 presidential and legislative elections, the Party of National Unity, a coalition backing Mwai Kibaki, formed after the NARC crumbled. Charity Kaluki Ngilu, the NARC secretary general, had left the party and joined ODM, taking with her NARC party registration documents, thereby putting Kibaki in legal limbo and without a party with which to run for re-election. The PNU was created to sustain Kibaki’s political survival. Before the balloting, a win for the Odinga-led ODM, or a loss for the Kibaki-led PNU, was being interpreted as emancipation by youth supporters of ODM and as ‘potential deprivation’ by PNU-aligned youths, with the winner potentially reaping benefits for their engagement. The electoral process was arguably a platform for negotiating social conflict. This situation produced conflict-inducing ideologies, perceptions, and opinions. As widely expected, the election was hotly contested. As the results trickled in, it became a foregone conclusion that ODM had trounced PNU and other small parties for legislative and civic seats. The ODM won overwhelmingly in Nyanza, Western, Rift 20. J. Biegon, ‘Electoral violence and fragility in Africa: Drawing lessons from Kenya’s experience in the 2007/8 post-election violence’, paper delivered at the conference ‘Financial Markets, Adverse Shocks and Coping Strategies in Fragile Countries’, Accra, Ghana, 21–23 May 2009. 21. Michael L. Fleisher, ‘Sungusungu: State-sponsored village vigilante groups among the Kuria of Tanzania’, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 70:11 (2000), 209–228; Martha K. Huggins, ‘Introduction: Vigilantism and the state—A look south and north’ in Martha K. Huggins (ed.), Vigilantism and the State in Modern Latin America: Essays on Extralegal Violence (New York, Praeger 1991), 1–18. 22. A. Reynolds, ‘Elections and electoral systems: Implications for conflict management’, Democracy and Elections in Africa, 2:13 (2006).