55 perspicacious about the problems being faced in Zimbabwe today, but they do have a good understanding of the problems, particularly as regards elections, political violence, and the use of draconian powers. They also have clear ideas about the ways in which the problems might be resolved, and suggest ways wholly consonant with a peaceful and democratic approach. So this work validates the Afrobarometer survey in many ways, but also suggests that the survey method may not have been able to elicit people’s attitudes as accurately as it might. Clearly, in the current political climate in Zimbabwe, an opinion poll is hardly as neutral an undertaking as a poll in a country such as South Africa, and, in fairness the 2004 Afrobarometer reports makes this point, but, on the data that we report here, Zimbabweans are clearly more engaged in the political life of their country than they will admit. An example here relates to some to some of the changes seen over time in the Afrobarometer surveys on Zimbabwe. In 1999, a very significant proportion of Zimbabweans indicated that they would have little to do with active involvement in political and civic issues104, and it is clear that many in 2004 are reluctant to confess to active political affiliation. But it is definitely the case that tens of thousands of Zimbabweans have become actively involved in political and civic life, and continue to do so in an increasingly repressive climate. So there is curious problem of people doing what they say they will not. Perhaps these findings will go some way to explaining a curious paradox about Zimbabwe, and a more curious paradox than increased support for Robert Mugabe. Zimbabweans clearly value democracy, and perhaps value also the ways in which democracy can be attained, and that is through democratic action rather than violent revolutionary struggle. The participants to the workshops described above did not see violence as an option for attaining democracy, but again and again spoke about non-violent struggle and the use of the tools of democracy – protest, litigation, and the like – as the means to achieve the changes they desire in their country. This is not an easy course to chart when the political power appears too comfortable with the use of violence and repressive power as the means to block any change. And given the relative sophistication of the attitudes explored with the youth and the victims, perhaps it is time that the world saw that the Zimbabwean crisis is a new chapter in African politics rather than merely another example of “liberalized autocracy” or “dominant power politics”. 104 In the 1999 survey, the data revealed the following: “The survey results demonstrate that the citizens of Zimbabwe are rather low on the active participation scale. If the degree of participation in civic life is an index of democracy, then democracy in Zimbabwe can be said to be still in a fledgling state. It must however be observed that about 25% of the respondents indicated that they would participate in political activity if they had the chance. This means the potential for participation is considerable; it needs to be tapped by creating a conducive or enabling institutional environment which is perceived as presently missing”. IDASA: Zimbabwe at the Cross-Roads: Views of Zimbabwean citizens on democracy and transitional justice.