Judgment No. CCZ 12/14 7 Civil Appeal No. SC 327/12 In these circumstances the applicant was entitled to approach this Court directly – Martin v Attorney General & Another 1993(1) ZLR 153(S) 158H; Mukoko v Commissioner-General of Police & Ors 2009 (1) ZLR 21, 24B. This Court must now place itself in the position it would have been in had the Magistrate, as he ought to have done, referred to it the question raised before him. WHETHER THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO A PERMANENT STAY OF PROCEEDINGS The factors that this Court is enjoined to consider in an application of this nature are now settled. These are (a) the length of the delay, (b) the reason given by the prosecution for the delay, (c) whether the accused person asserted his rights and (d) the prejudice occassioned to the accused by the delay – In re Mlambo 1991 (2) ZLR 339(S), 350 A-G; Fikilini v Attorney-General 1990 (1) ZLR 105, 113 A-H (SC). I proceed to consider each of these factors in turn. (a) THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY The delay in bringing the applicant to trial is reckoned from 25 June 2007 when she was charged. See Shumba v Attorney-General 1997 (1) ZLR 589, 592 G (S). The fact that charges were withdrawn in 2008 is irrelevant. The clock continued ticking. In re Mlambo (supra) at p 346 E-H. The applicant was summoned to appear in court for trial on 6 August 2012. The delay from the time she was cautioned was therefore just over five years. That delay was inordinate and sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the possible breach of the applicant’s rights under s 18(2) of the Constitution. (b) THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY