Judgment No. CCZ 11/15 9 Const. Application No. CCZ 28/11 I therefore dismiss this argument to the extent that it was meant to justify the denigration of the judiciary on the basis of the statement being ‘incidental” and therefore not seriously meant. I am satisfied, however, that the statement falls into the category of ‘acts’ contemplated by s 182(1) of the Code. To the extent that this section had not been repealed or otherwise struck off the statute books, it was clearly ‘a law’ which, in terms of s 20 (2)(ii) of the former Constitution, had the objective of ‘maintaining independence and authority of the courts.’ Words like ‘pliable’ and ‘compliant’ connote the very opposite of judicial independence and authority. The applicant bore the onus to prove his case, and it was incumbent upon him to discharge it. This point was reiterated in the Retrofit case (supra) thus; “From a procedural aspect, the onus is on the challenger to establish that the enactment under attack goes further than is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and not on the State to show that it does not” Applied to the circumstances of this case, I do not find that the applicant has discharged the onus that he bore, to establish that s 182 (1) should be struck down because it violated his right to freedom of expression in the manner that he alleges. 2. Freedom of association Section 21 of the old Constitution protected the right to freedom of association in the following terms: “(1) Except with his own consent or by way of parental discipline, no person shall be hindered in his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in particular to form or belong to political parties or trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests.”