farming, and voting will be ―polling-station specific‖. The possibilities of the system seen in 2008 being in place seem very high,13 although it is unlikely that there will be much violence. This will be backed up by some progress on the economy. The recent budget has received moderate critical approval, but it should be noted that over 50% of the expenditure is for only four ministries: the Office of the President, Defence, Home Affairs, and Education (Primary and Secondary Education). Ministries dealing with security get 27% of the budget, while Health gets just under 9%! Related to the election, it seems doubtful that there will be serious cuts in the number of soldiers or the police, and it is commonplace how critical their role has been during elections. The key issue, post-election, will be whether the victory for ZANU-PF ―cures‖ the coup. This seems to be the hope of all the externals: that an election that cannot be contested will allow all to accept the new regime. This will allow re-engagement, helped immeasurably by the disappearance of Robert Mugabe, and a modicum of state reform, together with the lowhanging fruits for economic reform, will enable everyone to get on with life. One very unhappy prospect will be the demolition of opposition political parties, and then will begin a lengthy process of re-organisation, probably taking a decade. However, if this does not work, and the elections are unsatisfactory to both internal and external forces, then things could get very tricky. Failure to win approval for the elections will undoubtedly exacerbate the crisis, especially the economic crisis. Investors are unlikely to be excited by continued political conflict, and the international community, while being unwilling to call regime change a ―coup‖, are equally unwilling to change their position in the absence of the rule of law, observance of human rights and good governance. This seems to be the position that the US will adopt, irrespective of whether they are lobbied by opposition political parties and civil society. The sine qua non of good governance in modern politics is good elections, and even better electoral alternation. ―Command‖ elections are unlikely to find international favour, and thus it can be predicted that the current crisis will continue. Furthermore, the predilection for the curative power of elections is also supplemented by the requirement for good governance, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, as in, for example, Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement.14 This will place civil society in a very difficult position, and especially because the military will have a much stronger say in government than ever before. Here bear in mind the dramatic increase in the power of the military after the 2008 ―coup‖, and think a little about the power that the military has now. Regionally, the rhetoric about NGOs being agents of ―regime change‖ has been growing strongly in the past few years, and it might be expected that this become more pronounced should ZANU-PF find itself still embattled on the international front. This, of course, will be selective as in the past, with human rights groups and other civic groups dealing with governance being the primary targets. And, of course, this a sector deeply weakened already by the funding crisis of the past three years. There are signs of this even now. Minister Chinamasa’s comments about the impossibility of devolution are not merely about costs, but more seriously about the intention to maintain 13 Sokwanele (2010), the Anatomy of Terror. [http://archive.kubatana.net/docs/demgg/sokwanele_anatomy_of_terror_110612.pdf] 14 RAU (2015), Zimbabwe, the European Union, and the Cotonou Agreement: An Opinion. January 2015, Harare: Research & Advocacy Unit; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2006), Zimbabwe’s Failure to meet the Benchmarks in the Cotonou Agreement, November 2006, Harare: Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.