65 S.C. 128\02 Emphasising the fact that the presumption has two meanings, the learned CHIEF JUSTICE said the following at 383E-F:- “I approach the decision of this matter on the basis that it is in these two senses and these two senses alone that there is a presumption of constitutionality”. Commenting on the first meaning of the presumption he said the following at 383A-E:“Even where the Constitution does not make it clear where the onus lies, as the Zimbabwe Constitution does, the onus lies on the challenger to prove that the legislation is not reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and not on the State to show that it is. In that sense there is a presumption of constitutionality … In that sense the presumption represents no more than the Court adopting the view that a legislature, elected by universal adult suffrage and liable to be defeated in an election, must be presumed to be a good judge of what is reasonably required or reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. But situations can arise even in such societies in which majorities oppress minorities, and so the Declaration of Rights prescribes limits within which rights may be restricted. It is only in cases where it is clear that the restriction is oppressive that the Court will interfere.” In my view, the learned CHIEF JUSTICE was merely saying that the burden of proof rested on the challenger, and that unless the challenged provision was clearly shown to be oppressive it would not be struck down. What he said should not be interpreted to mean that before the Court embarks upon the enquiry as to whether a restriction is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society it must be satisfied that the restriction is arbitrary and oppressive and cannot possibly be saved by the presumption of constitutionality.