It
is
therefore
likely
to
be
very
difficult
to
focus
SADC’s
attention
once
again
on
the
Zimbabwe
crisis
unless
regional
advocacy
is
based
on
growing
internal
dissent
and
consensus
around
the
lack
of
electoral
reform
and
persistent
denial
of
the
SADC
conditions
for
free
and
fair
elections.
This
situation
is
compounded
by
the
current
stance
of
the
EU.
Since
the
period
of
the
GNU
the
EU
moved
away
from
its
sanctions
policy
towards
a
re-‐engagement
with
the
Mugabe
Government.
This
move
was
part
of
a
more
general
loss
of
hope
in
the
political
alternatives
in
Zimbabwe.
In
the
post
2013
period
the
EU
has
concentrated
its
engagement
on
humanitarian
and
social
expenditure
assistance
to
the
Government
through
the
UNDP
and
support
for
ZEC.
The
latter
approach
is
based
on
the
rationale
that
such
support
will:
• Prepare
the
ground
for
a
more
substantive
engagement
in
the
event
of
a
legitimate
election
in
2018.
• Allow
the
EU
to
make
a
much
more
substantive
judgment
around
the
legitimacy
of
such
an
election.
• This
more
quiet
diplomacy
allows
the
EU
to
engage
the
Government
of
Zimbabwe
more
constructively
on
particular
policy
issues.
Towards
the
2018
Elections
For
the
Junta
in
Zimbabwe,
it
is
imperative
that
it
delivers
an
election
that
is
free
of
violence
even
if
they
fail
to
introduce
the
electoral
reforms
that
remain
one
of
the
major
outstanding
demands
set
out
under
the
Global
Political
Agreement
in
2008.
The
Mnangagwa
regime
desperately
needs
the
legitimacy
of
a
minimally
acceptable
election
to
move
beyond
the
cloud
of
the
military
intervention.
For
the
opposition
and
the
civic
movement,
it
is
imperative
to
accumulate
as
much
information
as
possible
around
the
problems
of
the
BVR
process
as
this
will
be
a
key
area
determining
the
acceptability
of
the
2018
elections.
Joshua
Nkomo’s
statue
amidst
anti-‐Mugabe
protests:
Bulawayo,
18
November
2017
13