8 Firstly, the identity of those causing the harm is frequently not known to the victim, and there may little or no possibility of subsequently discovering their identity. This is frequently the case in Zimbabwe: in AMANI’s experience in Mount Darwin, only two persons have been able to give a name to their torturers. Secondly, victims may be unwilling to reveal the names of their former persecutors for fear of retribution. This is uncommon in Mount Darwin, but has been a factor in Matabeleland, where many former torturers still retain public office in the military or a branch of the civil service. Thirdly, the former torturers are invariably part of a hierarchic chain of command, all of whom are responsible, and should be held responsible. Here, only the state has the power to hold all parties liable and to institute action against the entire chain. The instructive example here is from Germany, and the way in which prosecution of Nazi war criminals has proceeded against all persons involved in gross human rights violations: defence of orders by former soldiers and civil servants has not been allowed to ensure immunity from prosecution, although it has been allowed subsequently. Finally, only the state is in a position to meet the costs of damages. If civil suits against individuals is the only remedy for torture survivors, then wealthy human rights violators will be sued and poor violators escape, which is scarcely just. The principle here, as Lutz points out, is that damages must be measured according to the needs of victims and not the means of the perpetrators. As Lutz comments here: “Even states faced with severe economic problems must honour their duty to provide redress to former victims of human rights abuses. A state’s shortage of hard currency may, as a practical matter, delay some portion of compensation payments, but it should not be an excuse for failure to review claims or award appropriate damages. The very process by which a state acknowledges that a former victim is legally entitled to compensation is likely to restore that person’s sense that justice is being done and may have a positive impact on his or her mental health.” (Lutz.1989.p206) This is an important point, and one that has agreement from those concerned with the rehabilitation of torture survivors, who have made the point that compensation has rehabilitative as well as legal consequences.15 Lutz’s fourth point above, relating to the timing of damages claims, is very important too, more especially in the Zimbabwean situation of 1997, where government is seeking to set a time limit for claims. As Lutz comments, there is no statute of limitations for bringing criminal charges against those who have committed gross violations of human rights, which is amply attested by the continued prosecution of Nazi war criminals. However, there are practical considerations to be addressed in deciding upon civil damages, most important of these is that the damages will often be paid by a government that is not responsible for the human rights violations, as is the case with Zimbabwe. This may be unpalatable, but frequently states elect to pay damages rather than to allow politically unpopular prosecutions to take place. Indeed, it is often the case that any form of criminal prosecution of human rights offenders will create massive political instability, and here it is instructive to note the events in Chile, and particularly the events following the Letelier case.16 However, it is again important to stress a point made above: that the damages awards must be driven by victims’ needs rather than any other need. Victims will frequently place a higher priority on rebuilding lives after the abuse, and thus have little interest in damages for some considerable time after the event. Furthermore, as all those experienced in the rehabilitation of torture survivors will attest, many of the sequelae of torture are not immediately obvious to survivors, especially the psychic effects. There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that psychological disorders may only emerge years, and sometimes See Gordon (1994), “Compensation suits as an instrument in the rehabilitation of tortured persons”, TORTURE, 4, 111-114. See Lillich (19993), “Damages for Gross Violations of International Human Rights Awarded by US Courts”, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 15, 207-229. 15 16