Judgment No CCZ 2/14 8 Const. Application No CCZ 78/12 This Court too has had occasion to recognise the freedom of expression as a core value of a free and democratic society. See Retrofit (Pvt) Ltd v Posts and Telecommunications Corporation & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 199 (S) at 211C-F; United Parties v Minister of Justice Legal & Parliamentary Affairs 1997 (2) ZLR 254 (S) at 269A-E. More recently, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal made the following pronouncement per Streicher JA, in the case of Hoho v The State [2008] ZASCA 98 at para. 29: “The importance of the right to freedom of expression has often been stressed by our courts. Suppression of available information and of ideas can only be detrimental to the decision-making process of individuals, corporations and governments. It may lead to the wrong government being elected, the wrong policies being adopted, the wrong people being appointed, corruption, dishonesty and incompetence not being exposed, wrong investments being made and a multitude of other undesirable consequences. It is for this reason that it has been said ‘that freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and is one of the basic conditions for its progress and the development of man’.” It certainly cannot be gainsaid that the offence of criminal defamation operates to encumber and restrict the freedom of expression enshrined in s 20(1) of the former Constitution. On the other hand, it is also not in doubt that the offence of criminal defamation falls into the category of permissible derogations contemplated in s 20(2)(b)(i), as being a provision designed to protect the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons. What is in issue for determination by this Court is whether or not it is a limitation that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. The test as to what is democratically reasonable and justifiable is not susceptible to precise legal formulation. In my own appreciation, the test may well vary from one