have ‘retreated’ to Harare. Although several national NGOs retain a presence there, there is no representation from the two main networks (The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition). Many of these organisations will face closure if the government makes good its threat to pass legislation which will all but choke them of their remaining funding sources.41 This situation highlights the importance of identifying and mobilising resources and activities to priority constituencies. It will be important to develop profiles of where one can and cannot operate — existing violation reports provide a useful guide in this regard — and what remaining civil society infrastructure can be employed. A crucial, but perhaps less obvious, constraint has been the difficulties that civil society itself has experienced in co-operating and co-ordinating its activities beyond sector-specific activities. The formation of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, which brought together over 300 civil society groupings, presented an important opportunity to develop a more consolidated and strategic approach around a number of key areas. Despite some important successes in this regard, the Coalition has failed to effectively galvanise activities and facilitate mobilisation on a range of issues, including the transitional justice debate. Despite its broad membership base, it has also failed to adequately provide crucial networking services, especially in the field of information dissemination. This, in turn, has inhibited and constrained opportunities for mobilisation as well as the impact of its campaigning and advocacy work. Civil society actors dealing with human rights violations are also faced with a depreciating capacity as fewer and fewer ‘hands on deck’ are tasked with more and more challenges. Mounting levels of fatigue and disillusion further compound the situation. There is an increasing distance between ordinary Zimbabweans and ‘elite-led’ civil society processes. Broader civil society did not defend the rights of NGOs that would have been targeted by the government’s NGO Bill. This reflects the failure to invest in participatory processes that could have facilitated a broader mobilisation strategy amongst the general population. Any campaign or action to promote a transitional justice agenda must place a premium on communication, consultation and co-operation. Opportunities for information dissemination Despite prevailing circumstances, and the constraints placed upon information dissemination, opportunities for the spread of information remain. The extent to which these channels will be criminalised and closed down has yet to be seen. Legislation to control NGOs will certainly provide the State with an opportunity in this regard. For the time being, therefore, there remain a number of civil society networks that can provide channels of communication and information dissemination. These include many of the groupings listed previously. As also mentioned, a number of these groupings remain sympathetic to the 41 The NGO Bill lapsed after Mugabe refused to assent to it, but the government has promised to reintroduce it in due course. Considerable damage has already been done, however, as NGOs have had to divert limited resources to raise awareness and lobby against the legislation. Efforts to develop a united front against it were thwarted by humanitarian NGOs that failed to raise their voices in opposition, effectively isolating a dozen or so human rights organisations that have documented human rights violations and lobbied loudly and vociferously against them. Several organisations have also had trouble securing funding, as some donors wait to see what will happen before committing themselves to further support. 26