economy undoubtedly has more to do with Zanu-PF’s misgovernance and its penchant for selfdestructive economic policies”,37 giving the post-2000 land policies and resource nationalism through an attempted forced “indigenisation” of business, industry and mining, as examples. In any event, it appears likely that the impact of sanctions on the ZMDC and Zimbabwe’s economy is inconsequential and can in no way be used to explain Zimbabwe’s dramatic economic collapse after 2000. Spillover effects Pariah status The sanctions regime of the US does, however, have some spill-over effects. Disapprobative measures highlight Zimbabwe’s democratic deficits to the investor community and particularly past failures to respect property rights, which will be of considerable concern. The result is that Zimbabwe obtains something of a pariah status such that, all else being equal, investors may prefer a different investment destination. Ease of doing business The extent to which this obtains in practice is unknown as all else is not equal and other factors render Zimbabwe a singularly unattractive investment destination. Despite frequent claims that Zimbabwe is “blessed with abundant mineral sources” viable investment opportunities in mining (and anywhere else) are far from obvious. Furthermore, Zimbabwe remains low on the ease of doing business index,38 but perhaps the greatest disincentive for potential investors in Zimbabwe is the economic crisis itself. This means that investors are unable (despite Government assurances to the contrary) to remit dividends to offshore shareholders or repay loans to those who may otherwise have provided the capital for the venture in Zimbabwe. International Banking A major spillover effect related to the ease of doing business arises from the need for those sending US dollars to and from Zimbabwe to use US-based correspondent banks to effect the transfers. These banks cannot make transfers to or on behalf of SDNs and doing so attracts a hefty fine equivalent to the greater of $250,000 or twice the amount of the underlying transaction.39 Some banks have fallen foul of these provisions and money in transit to Zimbabwean entities confiscated en route.40 The consequence is that many more people and entities are affected than just SDNs. A correspondent bank asked to process a transfer to Zimbabwe will rarely be prepared to peel away the sometimes onion-like layers of the receiving entity to determine the ultimate beneficial shareholder of the entity, determine whether that owner is a SDN, and whether the OFAC regulations apply, which may require legal counsel. It is easier and less risky to simply decline to deal with Zimbabwe related transactions. In some ways this problem is self- inflicted as it would not arise if there was more transparency around beneficial 37 At p11. 155 out of 190 economies. 39 OFAC Guide Zimbabwe Sanctions Program December 2013 p5. 40 For example, in 2013 OFAC reportedly intercepted a US$2.1 million loan granted to Olivine Industries by the PTA Bank as the Industrial Development Corporation held a 51% shareholding in Olivine as was a SDN. Standard Chartered Bank agreed a settlement of an 18 million payment to OFAC for transactions related to Zimbabwean SDNs – see https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20190408_scb_webpost.pdf (in 2019). There are also reports (in 2017) that a fine of US$385 million was levelled against CBZ Holdings on account of dealings on behalf of SDN, ZB Bank, though it is unclear how the fine applies to a non-US person. The fine was challenged by CBZ, and it seems the matter remains unresolved. 38 11