BALLOT News X Issue No. 2 From page 5 held under its proposed provisions. This will relate to the full import of what the state and its structures could possibly mean. I also intend to raise the spectacle of Zanu PF managing its succession politics through the amendments. And lastly I will attempt at an appraisal of the response that has been given by civil society, together with the opposition, to this Zanu PF succession project and highlight some fundamental issues that are at stake as a result of the aforementioned issues. I will however, not delve into the sections of the Bill. A Reconfiguration of A patrimonial but Distant State The proposals within the Bill are interesting to those that have studied the manner and mannerisms in which states are reconfigured. In this particular instance, the bill has come to represent reconfiguration of the Zimbabwean state through the elite at the expense of input from the ordinary citizenry. That the ruling party intends to undertake this constitutional reform exercise solely through its parliamentary majority is indicative of politics without the people. It is also a significant pointer to how politics has come to be played out solely within the confines of distant institutions such as parliament and still be assumed to be legitimate because the members within the legislature were elected to enact law. Those that view parliament in such a narrow sense fail to grasp an evident reality that the Zimbabwean state, as a political entity, is facing a serious legitimacy crisis with its populace. This is because the output from Parliament over the last seven years has been all about increasing state repression and justifying the closure of political space under the pretext of 'Third Chimurengas' whilst forgetting that there is always need for the state to be relevant and legitimate to the people. In this sense, Constitutional Amendment Number 18 then becomes an exercise that merely exacerbates the X September 2007 illegitimacy of the state. In typical fashion, the proposed amendments are viewed by the people as another Zanu PF ploy to prolong their stay in power, and as a result thereof, these proposals do not incite any form of public interest because the public does not consider it any of their business. Zanu PF And Long Haul Politics It is also because of this increasing delegitimisation of the state that the proposed amendments can be viewed as being mainly about Zanu PF attempting to make a national and final search for a solution to its succession politics. The ruling party in our country has decided to take its internal politics out of its central committee and straight into the national legislature through one specific clause that allows a joint sitting of the House of Assembly and the Senate to elect a President until the next general election. Whilst it can be argued that there are some democracies with this sort of clause, it cannot be but suspicious that the government of Zimbabwe is proposing this at a critical time for the ruling party. It is a public secret that Zanu PF has been talking succession for some time now and the proposals in Number 18 merely enable Zanu PF to allow President Mugabe to handpick a successor who will then be easily elected by Parliament, especially given the likelihood that Zanu PF will have an evident majority in the bicameral parliament. This also means that the ruling party will try all means, and through the liaison of Number 18, to ride out the current economic crises until at least it wins a parliamentary majority and the presidential election in March 2008. Following which, its current leader will serve only a portion of his term in office and leave the rest to an approved successor in a style very similar to the politics of Botswana's ruling party. This successor will obviously have to have some credibility with the West, SADC and the African Union as well as promise a sprinkling of democratic reforms to the Zimbabwean state in order to court the much needed foreign direct investment. 6 Civil Society and the Opposition It is also important to consider the reactions and roles that civil society organizations have etched for themselves within the processes that Amendment Number 18 has created. There has evidently been a muted response from civil society about Amendment Number 18. The reasons are obviously around a given weariness of the issue of constitutional reform that borders on resignation and of course wanting to leave the struggle over the same issue to the NCA. This is, at best, a very impolitic response that does not galvanize the public to realize the national and structural significance of the proposed changes to the constitution. It might be imperative to remind colleagues in civil society that this is not 'business as usual'. Amendment Number 18 leaves the oppositional movements in Zimbabwe with the potential of not being able to challenge Zanu PF's hegemony outside of the framework of elections until 2013. In essence, therefore, civil society must reengage the public on Constitutional Amendment Number 18 in a manner akin to the 'no vote' campaign of 2000. It must also provide its own draft constitution and explain why it is a better alternative to the one being proposed by Constitutional Amendment Number 18. And in doing this, it must be mindful of the fact that there is need to think beyond March 2008, and prepare for the long haul of oppositional politics against a reformed and reforming Zanu PF. In ending, there are political realities that we as Zimbabweans need to grasp. The ruling party is not going to stop Constitutional Amendment Number 18, primarily because it is designed to assist it manage its succession politics. Simultaneously, it must not be lost on those of us in the oppositional movement, that these proposed amendments represent 'Rubicon' or 'River Jordan' political frameworks for a democratic Zimbabwe. March 2008 is extremely important both in its results as well as in our preparedness to tackle its vicissitudes with foresight