• Where proceedings have been pending for a substantial time, often for several years, without there being a convincing explanation for the length of time taken towards reaching a decision.123 What length of time is reasonable in the circumstances depends on the particulars of the case. The Human Rights Committee, for example, found that the passage of eighteen months in proceedings relating to torture and conditions of detention that were pending before the Magistrates Court and the Supreme Court in the case of Fernando v. Sri Lanka did not amount to ‘unduly prolonged’ remedies.124 In the case of Pimentel v. the Philippines, the Committee held that domestic proceedings relating to the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages to torture survivors were not ‘unduly prolonged’ on the ground that the Supreme Court of the Philippines had rendered a favourable decision and reinstated the case.125 On the other hand, a delay of three years in determining a fundamental rights case for torture in the case of Rajapakse v Sri Lanka, and a period of eight years for deciding on the issue of a filing fee in a proceeding forming part of Pimentel v the Philippines was considered as rendering the respective remedy ‘unduly prolonged.’126 b) Merits: Proving a violation Once a case has been declared admissible, the applicant(s) must demonstrate that there has been a delay for which the state party concerned is responsible. This can be done by demonstrating that the national authorities knew about an allegation but failed to act and/or that they had not taken specific investigatory measures by a certain date, or only very belatedly. Showing that such investigative failings are common in similar cases and part of a widespread if not systematic practice would further strengthen the case of the applicants. The state party would then have to refute the argument, showing why such a delay was not unreasonable notwithstanding the duty to investigate promptly and to conduct investigations expeditiously. c) Provisional measures and reparation awarded by human rights bodies Lawyers may seek a range of remedies where a breach is found. The availability of such remedies will depend on the national legislation in place and the practice of the regional human rights court or international human rights body concerned. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in particular, has ordered far-reaching remedies that include the obligation to conduct effective investigations and make legislative changes.127 This contrasts with the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, which tends to confine itself to some measures of restitution and compensation when awarding ‘just satisfaction.’128 Against this 122 Amnesty International and others v Sudan, paras.29 et seq. 123 See in particular the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee in Rajapakse v. Sri Lanka, paras.6.1, 6.2., and Bandara Dingi v. Sri Lanka, para.6.4. 124 Fernando v Sri Lanka, para.8.2. 125 Pimentel v the Philippines, para.8.2. 126 Ibid., para.8.3. and Rajapakse v Sri Lanka, paras.6.1, 6.2. 127 Article 63 (1) of the American Convention of Human Rights. See for the rich jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court on remedies, for example, Castro-Castro v Peru, paras.410 et seq.; Tibi v Ecuador, paras. 222 et seq. and Blanco-Romero v Venezuela, paras.66 et seq. 128 Article 41 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See for compensation in torture case, Mikheyev v. Russia, paras.146 et seq. and Selmouni v. France, paras.120 et seq. In cases of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment where detainees are unlawfully detained, the European Court of Human Rights may, in addition to compensation, order the release of the person thus detained, see Assanidze v. Georgia, paras.202, 203 and Ilascu and others v. Russia and Moldova, para.490. 27