34 IRI/NDI Zimbabwe International Election Observation Mission Final Report act in support of ZANU-PF and President Mnangagwa. However, the case was dismissed based on Mnangagwa’s immunity as president and not as a political candidate.41 As the rulings in favor of the opposition were largely unenforced and the latter case was dismissed, they were seen as doing little to deter the behavior of traditional leaders as the election process moved forward. In addition, the lack of enforcement of the law and continued engagement with traditional leaders was perceived by some to be an indication of lack of political will on the part of the government and ruling party to enforce constitutional provisions, which had been explicitly designed to reduce the role of traditional leaders in partisan politics. Others argued that ZANU-PF was unwilling to speak against the partisan activities of traditional leaders as they benefited from the practice. In rural areas, traditional leaders and local chiefs were observed exerting influence over their respective communities by telling citizens whom to vote for, forcing people to attend ZANU-PF campaign events and threatening banishment from a village if a voter failed to vote for ZANUPF. Traditional leaders also played a role in the partisan distribution of food aid and contributed to fears about the lack of secrecy of the vote by recording voters’ registration serial numbers and suggesting this information and data collected through the BVR process allowed their vote to be known. It should be noted that traditional leaders did not uniformly support ZANU-PF. While the vast majority did, there were some cases of independent traditional leaders who did not take sides and a few who supported the opposition. In Masvingo, for example, some traditional leaders encouraged voters to select the candidate of their choice and contributed to educating citizens about the secrecy of the vote. In addition, a handful of chiefs invited one of the smaller parties to campaign in their communities. In Masvingo, Mashonaland West, and Mashonaland East, some traditional leaders privately supported the opposition, even as they outwardly displayed support for the ZANU-PF out of fear of reprisals, such as loss of position or government resources. Multi-Party Liaison Committees (MPLC) The Electoral Act provides for the establishment of MPLCs at the national, provincial, constituency, and local authority levels. The main aim of these committees is to provide a forum for dialogue regarding election-related matters and to ensure observance of the Code of Conduct for Political Parties and Candidates. For the July 30 elections, the MPLCs were established after the close of the nomination process at national and local levels.42 At the national level, the MPLC met only four times prior to the July 30 elections. These four meetings were largely focused on party grievances with the ZEC and election administration, such as the integrity of the voters roll, the printing of ballot papers, and the positioning of the voting booths, and did not consider violations of the Code of Conduct. While the first national MPLC meeting held on June 22 was interrupted, the remaining three proceeded without significant impasse or conflict. However, some stakeholders expressed frustration over the infrequency and lack of regularity of meetings as well as the duration of time between the second and third meeting, which amounted to three weeks. In addition, concerns were raised that those in attendance, both ZEC officials and party representatives, were unable to 41 MDC v. E.D. Mnangagwa, ZANU PF, Chief F. Charumbra and Chief A. Tome. The court ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the president, who is not liable for civil or criminal proceedings for actions in his capacity as president. 42 Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13], s.160B (1),