Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Report — Of Stuffed ballots and Empty Stomachs INTRODUCTION In March, 2005 the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum published a report reviewing the pre-election period in Zimbabwe. That report outlined the conditions prior to the March 31st 2005 election and how those conditions rendered a truly democratic election impossible. It is not intended in this report to repeat the observations made there, except where it is necessary to do so for the sake of clarity. However, that report should be read in conjunction with this one, as many of the facts presented there will be of relevance. This report will consider the actual period of voting and the first one hundred days thereafter. ZANU(PF)’s stated aim was to command a two-thirds majority in the House,1 and to do so through an election that would have regional, if not international, legitimacy. While the ruling ZANU(PF) party had retained power following the 2000 Parliamentary Elections and 2002 Presidential Elections, the endemic and systemic violence that accompanied those elections undermined any claim to legitimacy. The result was extensive international isolation and difficulties for regional leaders, caught between their support for Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and international condemnation. Democratic legitimacy following the 2005 elections was thus not only a key objective of Mugabe’s regime, it was a regional strategy. It is probable that this is why the SADC Principles and Guidelines for Democratic Elections, agreed upon at a summit in Mauritius in August 2004, were drawn up as and when they were. If Mugabe gave a passing nod to these principles, the SADC community would have a basis upon which to grant the elections a clean bill of health. Mugabe facilitated this stratagem by repealing and replacing the Electoral Act.2 Several provisions of the new Act provided paid lip service to democratic principles and these provisions were eagerly seized upon by regional leaders.3 Yet, as will be seen below, a more sincere analysis of its provisions reveals it to be less than benign. ZANU(PF) achieved its second objective, an effective two-third majority, with an 8-seat margin.4 Such a comprehensive victory seems to defy logic, given that the elections were conducted at a time of deep economic malaise and concomitant severe privation for large sections of the electorate. Having said this, it should be noted that the large majority in Parliament does not stem entirely from the election. Of the 120 contested seats ZANU(PF) won 1 2 3 4 The majority required to amend the Constitution. Chapter 2.01 was replaced by Chapter 2:13. See for example section 3 of the Act “General Principles of Democratic Elections” which borrows from the Guidelines. ZANU(PF) does not have a two-thirds majority of elected seats. However, since the Presidential appointees (see immediately below in the text) can be relied upon to vote for ZANU(PF), a two-thirds majority is virtually guaranteed for ZANU(PF). 5