At Morgan Zintech Teacher Training College administrative staff were apparently given a list of 235 people for certification as if those on the list had gone through the full year training period to be qualified teachers, when they had not. This refusal of permanent secretaries (all unilaterally re-appointed by Mugabe with Tsvangirai's later and grudging acceptance of the fait accompli) to implement Ministerial policy is believed to be reflected in all Ministries with the exception of the Ministry of Finance. ZANU PF policy in this regard is graphically illustrated by the fact that the Deputy Minister of Education has been inciting ZIMTA, the ZANU PF aligned and rival union to PTUZ, to go on strike over poor wages. The split between the permanent secretaries and Ministerial policy was borne out by information provided by a stakeholder from the health sector. Although there has been less violence and instability, more learning is now taking place in schools and many hospitals are functional and stocked with drugs since the advent of the IG, there is little actual governance or power sharing taking place. Service delivery is commanded at permanent secretary level and where this takes place effectively, in most instances, this is in spite of ostensible power-sharing rather than because of it. The position within the Ministry of Health is illustrative. The Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health is a very capable and experienced administrator. He is on top of his game, makes the Minister naively believe that he is in control, but effectively runs matters entirely to his liking. Good administrators make some areas of service delivery efficient while others, even with ample donor inputs, are unable to do so. The IG could certainly not be said to be working as a power-sharing arrangement simply because some Ministerial mandates are being carried out efficiently. One female participant, referred to the expectations that had been created around poverty reduction. There was a sharp increase in impoverished women in the post March 29th election period as a result of the violence to which many women were exposed. Many left their rural homes for the cities for protection or left after their rural homes were destroyed, arriving in the cities with nothing to sustain themselves. There had been some hope that reparations would be forthcoming under the IG through the implementation of some form of transitional justice and establishment of an appropriate mechanism to address this issue. Severe health crises had affected women in 2008 as a result of rape, cholera and HIV/AIDS. Many people living with aids were separated from the source of their medication and had to stop treatment. To recommence treatment requires a CD4 count test. Yet most equipment used for these tests is out of service and broken, requiring that the tests be taken at private institutions at a cost beyond the reach of many rural women. If these issues are not addressed, women will feel they have gained little from the IG and that it is not “working”. Certainly current levels of violence are reduced and the Constitution making process has created a window of opportunity for NGO penetration into the rural areas (which was previously impossible). This has allowed civic education to take place, especially through the promotion of the Women's Charter which has now become a major focal point for lobbying. Although women's NGOs have been able to engage with various Ministries to make demands and to call for 50% of parliamentary committees to comprise women, this is insufficient to convince the women's NGOs that the IG is working. 3