The participant had personally witnessed the presence of the military and deployment of youth militia in schools on a visit to Buhera. There is some cynicism in the community about the idea of a changed ZANU PF mind set, as any talk of national healing and reconciliation results in threats from army or police personnel. The communities also note that there is no attempt to address the experiences and violence of 2008 and such healing initiatives that do take place, are insincere. A recent Mass Public Opinion Institute survey revealed that, nationwide, less than 10% of respondents are prepared to openly declare their allegiance for ZANU PF. All these factors suggest it is apparent to ZANU PF if the current situation persists, that it can only win the next election through a repeat of the levels of violence perpetrated in June, 2008 and that it is preparing accordingly. What is to be done? The question then arose as to what could be done to counter this ZANU PF strategy. However, before proceeding to consider this issue the group noted several inhibitory factors. Firstly, the MDC has combined forces with ZANU PF to present the IG as “working”, albeit with a few hiccups and expected tensions, as outlined above. Parliament, for example, effectively has become a “one party organisation”. While this spin and “make believe” politics is manifestly false, it has been picked up by the media, predominantly that of South Africa and to a large extent by the donor community. Sympathy for the MDC and/or antipathy to Mugabe has silenced proper analysis. South African President Jacob Zuma and SADC have enthusiastically embraced this spin. The net result is that opposition, identification of the problem and thus development of responsive tactics has been abandoned. One small but significant example referred to by the group was Webster Shamu’s defiant statement that he does not take instructions from the Prime Minister and “who is Morgan Tsvangirai to tell me that the press can cover [events] without accreditation”. The MDC’s response to this belittling incident was extremely muted1. Secondly, as a concomitant of the above policy, MDC officials and Ministers expect civic groups to align themselves with the MDC simply because they are on the ‘right’ side. To do otherwise, it is suggested, is to align oneself with or play into the hands of alleged residual elements who seek to collapse the IG. Reconstruction takes time and critics merely undermine efforts in this regard. Once more the result is a silencing and lack of any appropriate response. Thirdly, and again as a concomitant of the first inhibitory factor, civics are being starved of the resources and information necessary to make them an effective force for democratic change. Critiquing the MDC The Media Considering the closed media space, one participant suggested that the MDC should look for alternative media strategies. It has not done so. Instead of pro-actively issuing press releases and gaining access to foreign electronic media for interviews in which they might outline the achievements of the MDC and the people, battles fought and won, and the values and principles of the MDC, they passively await an invitation from broadcasters such as SW Radio. The Prime Minister’s newsletter does not address this problem. It skirts issues and is very carefully eliding and ignoring crucial points. The format appears elitist and is alienating for most Zimbabweans 1 5 Here it should be noted that there have been a number of developments since this round table was convened, and hence some comments are necessarily historical.