(d) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause provisions of the Constitution." 119. The above approach, has been consistently applied in a number of decisions including the National Coalition for Gays and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 200 (2) SA 1 (CC), which is referred to in the Constitutional Court's decision of Gumede (born Shange) v President of the Republic of Sout/1 Africa & Others (CCT 50/08), ]ooste v Score Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC), Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development & Others 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC), Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC), J v Director General Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC). 120. The approach in Zimbabwe law has hardly been any different. To begin with, our Courts have been consistent, in the few cases that have been heard before the same, in holding that discrimination on the grounds of sex is not permitted. Wazara v Principal of Belvedere Tecl1nical Teachers College and Anotl1er 1997 (2) 508 (H), dealt with the question of discrimination against women in the form of the right of a college to expel a pregnant woman. Smith J, had no hesitation in holding that would constitute unlawful discrimination for the purposes of Section 23 (2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe although the only caveat being that Constitutional of Zimbabwe Amendment No. 14 being Act No. 14 of 1996, only became law on the 6th of December 1996, a few days before this case was decided. 12 12 lt was Constitutional Amendment No. 14, which introduced the concept of discrimination based on gender. Page 40 of 46 Applicant's Heads of Argument in the matter between: Loveness lvludzuru & Another v Minister of Justice Legal & Parliamentary Affairs & 2 Others Case Number CCZ 79/2014 Prepared byTcndai Biti Law