Constitutional Court Mawarire v Mugabe NO & Ors Malaba DCJ the requisite conditions of the exercise of the power. So s58(1) as the source of the discretionary power defines the circumstances when the power may be exercised not when it must be exercised. There is in my view of the nature of the power conferred on the President by s 58(1) no legal duty on him to fix 29 June 2013 or a day after as the date of the first elections as suggested by the applicant. This is not a case where the date of general election following automatic dissolution of Parliament is precisely determined in the Constitution. The date is left to be chosen by authority vested with the power to do so within a framework of time determined by the Constitution. Within that timeframe the authority is left with a fairly large margin of appreciation in choosing the day or days in which the election will have to take place. In that regard the court has no power to dictate to the President when and how he should exercise the discretion vested in him by the Constitution. It is important that the repository of the discretionary power to fix the date of the first elections is the President. He is a democratically elected authority. As he is vested with the power to fix the date of the “first elections” in his capacity as the President of the Republic, he is expected to take into account relevant factors relating to the proper conduct of the elections in the national interest. He does not in that capacity act as a leader of a political party. The content of the discretionary power is very clear. It is the fixing of a day or days on which the first elections are to be held. The discretionary power is to be exercised in exercised in respect of a specific matter. Which day or days the President chooses to fix as the dates for the election is a matter strictly within his discretion. The court cannot get involved in determining for the President the manner in which he should exercise his discretion. It cannot tell the President which day or days he should fix or that he was wrong in fixing a certain day. It is not the function of a court of law to substitute its own wisdom and discretion for that of the person to whose judgment a matter is entrusted by the law. Whilst a court can review a public officer’s action for legality it cannot act as if it were the Executive. The real issue in this case arises because of the interpretation of the conditions and restrictions imposed by the law on the exercise of the discretionary power by the President. The first condition is of course not so controversial. It relates to the form the exercise of the discretion should take. The President is required to give notice to the public of the day or days he has fixed for the holding of the first elections in the Gazette. Upon public notification, the date or dates fixed for the elections have legal effect. The fact that the manner by which the President is required to make known to the public the result of the exercise of his discretion is by proclamation published in the Gazette means that it is an unconditional notification. It cannot be conditional upon the President reserving for himself the right to dissolve Parliament by proclamation. That would be the implication if the contention by the applicant that the proclamation fixing the date of the first elections must be issued some four months before the date of automatic dissolution of Parliament is accepted. The next condition is one in respect to which the interpretation of s 58(1) by the applicant has given rise to the question for determination. In my view s 58(1) is clear. It gives the President the discretionary power to fix a day or days for the holding of the first elections to fall within a period of four months calculated from the date of occurrence of any of the events referred to in ss 63(4) and 63(7) of the former Constitution. The date or dates fixed for the holding of the first elections must follow the date of the happening of the event concerned. 16