When such information is added to reports that President Mbeki has known since 2002 about the undemocratic electoral practices of the Mugabe regime, having received a report by judges Khampepe and Moseneke on these issues, 43 then it is apparent that the South African Presidency is fully aware of the authoritarian basis of Mugabe’s rule. It is highly unlikely, therefore that conditions can be created for a presidential run-off election in the near future. The second option, and one which may be more appealing to the SADC mediator is to negotiate some form of Government of National Unity, most likely headed by ZANU PF which it is hoped could develop conditions for greater stability in Zimbabwe. A pivotal aspect of the policy of quiet diplomacy has always been a concern that the Zimbabwean military would not accept an MDC government. In the light of the violence that has been unleashed since the March election, headed by the military, this concern will be even more urgent for the Mbeki mediation. It is therefore arguable that the election results have become a secondary factor in the mediation, to be used only in so far as they push the agenda for a Government of National Unity. If this is indeed the case then the terrible lesson of the recent Zimbabwe election, as in Kenya, is that elections, rather than being a modality for a renewed legitimacy, provide the prelude to the re-assertion of authoritarian political projects by the electoral loser. A Government of National Unity could become the bridge that allows that to happen, if it is not part of a broader project to change the form of the current state. However it is clear that another election at this point is only likely to exacerbate the crisis. Recommendations 1. A run-off of the Presidential election is neither practical nor desirable in the current environment of state violence. The SADC mediator should therefore take urgent steps to bring the major parties together into a renewed mediation process. This next stage of the mediation should discuss the following: 43 • Immediate demobilization of the ruling party structures orchestrating the violence n Zimbabwe. SADC observers should be sent into the country immediately to observe and assist this process. • Discussions around the creation of transitional government composed of representatives of the MDC and ZANU PF to map out conditions for political stabilization, humanitarian assistance and interim measures to help stabilise the economy. • Such a transitional authority should then map out the process for the creation of a new constitution, and the conditions necessary for such a constitution to come into force. • A recognition by both the mediator and SADC that the central obstacle to a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe is Robert Mugabe and those elements in his security and political structures for whom a political alternative is unthinkable. Michael Bleby and Karima Brown, “Mbeki ‘ignored judges’ on Mugabe’s stolen poll.” Business Day, 12/05/08. 19