2.
Causes
The De Doorns incident was the first time violence against foreigners had occurred in a rural
as opposed to an urban setting, and it very selectively targeted Zimbabweans, as opposed to
all foreigners – Lesotho nationals in the same area were not targeted.107 The attacks happened
at the height of the seasonal fruit picking in the grape growing valley of De Doorns. However,
the attacks were more as a result of competition among labour brokers, than because
Zimbabweans were being given preference by farmers who employ labour on a short‐term
basis.108 Inquiries by FMSP researchers established that there was no shortage of work in
the valley at that time, but certain labour brokers did not like the fact that local farmers prefer
to employ Zimbabwean labour as they are perceived to be more hard working. ie there was
enough work for everyone, but certain brokers were losing out to other brokers. It is also
clear from the current study that Zimbabwean labour was being paid at or above the
minimum wage for agricultural labour, so the commonly espoused position that migrants
work for less and ruin the labour market was also not true. What this case illustrates is how
easy it is for unscrupulous individuals, including politicians, to stoke the embers of ethnic
tension and to feed on preconceptions about migrants for their own ends.
3.
Support to displaced
The Zimbabwean labourers, the vast majority of whom held Asylum Seeker Permits and were
thus fully entitled to work in South Africa, were moved to a sports field in De Doorns on 17th
November. The Red Cross provided a clinic and food for three weeks, followed by two more
weeks of more limited support. The UNHCR did not respond until the second week after the
displacement, when they provided tents. There was a fairly chaotic process of registration by
UNHCR, with many of the legitimately displaced failing to get registered because they were at
work during registration, and barely more than half those registered ever receiving ID cards.
This has meant that access to the camp has been very disorganized and poorly controlled. The
UNHCR withdrew from the camp after three weeks, and came once a week for a further three
weeks. Senior UNHCR officials said that the camp conditions should not be too good, so that
people would reintegrate – although there is little evidence that the latter has happened.109
They also commented that looking after Zimbabweans was not their mandate as they were by
and large not refugees or asylum seekers: in fact the vast majority at De Doorns are asylum
seekers.110
Four months later, many Zimbabweans had already moved on as conditions were poor and
levels of fear were high. However, around 1,200 to 1,400 Zimbabweans continue to reside on
this site. Most suffered enormous material losses during the attacks. The UNHCR and Red
Cross are now no longer involved in direct support to the camp, although they attend monthly
meetings. The government is paying for the use of the floodlights, the only source of light on
the field, and also for portable toilets that are reportedly not being adequately serviced. To
protect these 1,200 people, there are only two security guards. There is no health care
provided for those on this site.
107 Op cit for information in this paragraph and the one following.
108 FMSP, ibid.
109 Hanekom, ibid.
110 As noted in the main body of this report, the blanket issuing of ASPs in the face of no other clear policy, is
doubtless resulting in many thousands of people claiming ASPs who otherwise would not – but this is an issue
for the UNHCR to take up with the South African authorities and not to take out on Zimbabwean ASP holders.
39
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