Zi m ba bw e’s CONST I TUT I O na l REFORM pr o ce ss can be characterised as a ‘hard case’ in terms of transitional justice, in that members of an authoritarian regime retain significant capacity for violence and the ability to threaten the new polity if attempts are made to punish them (Stacey 2004). Under the GPA, ZANU-PF retained control of the defence portfolio and, by extension, significant capacity for violence. Thus, as president, Mugabe retains the potent executive office, as well as control over the influential echelons in the state’s military and security apparatus. This close relationship has probably also protected the armed forces from being made accountable for any wrongdoing, despite the fact that opposition parties have accused them of committing human-rights abuses since the early 2000s. There has been a glaring lack of political will among the governing parties to drive the process of transitional justice and reconciliation in Zimbabwe. Although the Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration (ONHRI) was established for consultative processes in February 2008, Mashingaidze (2010: 24) highlights the inherent weaknesses of ONHRI and the challenges it confronts: For truth and justice to take place, there should be strong moral rejection of the former regime, and a clear consensus that its system was bad and its agents guilty of moral wrongs. There should also be a clear definition of what was wrong with the past. The Inclusive Government is in reality, however, a case of transition without transformation. ZANU (PF)-aligned functionaries still control the police and army, the Attorney General’s office, the reserve Bank and provincial governance. There is also no clear definition or understanding of what went wrong in the past. Although ONHRI gathered Zimbabwean views and concerns about national healing processes between February 2009 and February 2010, no substantive ‘heal the nation’ measures were subsequently implemented (Mashingaidze 2010: 25). More than three years after the formation of the inclusive government, very few prosecutions have occurred in Zimbabwe as a result of human-rights violations. Significantly, the consolidated draft constitution prepared by COPAC in April 2012 reportedly provides for the creation of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission through an Act of parliament (Newsday 2012). The functions of the envisaged commission include (but are not limited to) investigating pre- and post-independence political conflicts, recommending remedies for victims of these conflicts and promoting reconciliation.9 The Act is expected to empower the commission to grant immunity to perpetrators of humanrights abuses, order wrongdoers to apologise or compensate victims, impose penalties for non-compliance, and recommend measures to prevent future conflicts and abuses of human rights (Newsday 2012). If created, the commission could allow for investigations into past human-rights abuses including the 1980s Gukurahundi massacres, election-related violence that occurred in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2008, as well as during Operation Murambatsvina in 2005. This would be significant as Zimbabwe needs a justice and reconciliation process, not only at the level of the political leadership but one that has the potential to heal the widespread societal wounds resulting from the poisoned political environment and the associated deep suspicions and entrenched hatreds. Prospects for a constitutional referendum and elections As shown, Zimbabwe’s constitutional-reform process has occurred in fits and starts, and COPAC is still to produce a draft of the new supreme law of the land more than two years after its inception. According to the timetable laid down in Article 6 of the GPA, COPAC is required to swiftly table the draft document for discussion and validation before another 9