believes the term ‘discrimination’ as used in the Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms”.162 The definition is broad, does not require discriminatory intent and encompasses both direct and indirect discrimination. With regard to violations of women’s rights in the area of immigration laws, employment, pensions and matrimonial benefits, the HRC has generally held that laws that discriminate between men and women breach Article 26.163 In General Comment No. 28 relating to Article 3 on equality between men and women, the HRC asserts that “Article 2 and 3 [of the ICCPR] requires States parties to take all steps necessary, including the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of sex, to put an end to discriminatory actions both in the public and the private sector[s] which impair the equal enjoyment of rights”.164 In Lovelace v. Canada,165 Canadian law had removed the applicant’s Native Indian status because she had married a non-Native Indian man. Under the same legislation, the reverse situation would not have resulted in loss of status for a man. The HRC held that ongoing denial of her Indian status and therefore to return to the reserve following her divorce violated her right as a person belonging to a minority and her right to equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex. The decision implies that the protection of culture cannot discriminate against women on the basis of their sex. This provision is useful to women who experience violation of their rights in the name of culture or religion. The practice of honour crimes that sometimes takes the form of sexual violence is often tolerated in several countries in the name of protecting culture or religion. ii) Torture of family members of the disappeared Another pioneering decision from the HRC is application of Article 7 to indirect torture i.e. the suffering endured by persons close to the victim of torture or of enforced disappearance. In Quenteros v. Uruguay, the HRC understood ‘the anguish and stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty concerning her fate and whereabouts. … In these respects, she too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant suffered by her daughter in particular, of article 7.’ 166 The HRC has thus legitimised the claims of many mothers, wives and daughters of victims of torture or disappearance and expanded the torture prohibition for women. iii) Recognition of due diligence obligations to prevent and respond to harm by non-State actors The Human Rights Committee has recognised in a number of general comments the positive obligations on States to prevent and respond to violence committed by non-State actors, and the fact that a failure to respond appropriately may amount to a violation by the State itself. In General Comment No. 31, the Committee explained that the general obligations to 162 Ibid., ¶ 7. 163 Aumeeruddy-Cziffra v. Mauritius, HRC Comm. No. 35/1978 (9April 1981); Avellanal v. Peru, HRC Comm.No. 172/1984 (28 October 1988); Broeks v. The Netherlands, HRC Comm.No. 172/1984 (9 April 1987); Pauger v. Austria, HRC Comm.No. 718/1996 9 July 1997); Zwaan de Vries v. The Netherlands, HRC Comm.No. 182/1984 (9 April 1987). 164 HRC, General Comment No.28: Equality of Rights Between Men and Women (Article 3) (2000), UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 ¶ 4. 165 Lovelace v. Canada, HRC Comm. No. 24/1977 (30 July 1981); J.L. v. Australia, HRC Comm. No. 491/1992 (28 July 1992). 166 Quinteros v. Uruguay, HRC Comm. No. 107/1981 (23 July 1983) para 14. REDRESS | INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 47