THE CASE OF HENRY DOWA resources to this admittedly unusual case. The Secretary-General’s letter confirms that the reason for not proceeding in Kosovo was that which UNMIK gave earlier: lack of resources. Less easy to accept is the reasoning and decision which followed: “As the Kosovo authorities have not received any request for Mr.Dowa’s extradition, it is our view that it is now the legal responsibility of the Zimbabwe authorities to conduct a prompt and full investigation into the allegation against him, with a view to his possible prosecution. This being so, we have formally requested the Government of Zimbabwe to withdraw Mr.Dowa from service in Kosovo so that he may return home to participate in that process. We have also officially requested that we be kept informed of the outcome of those proceedings, and have indicated our expectation that any investigation shall be carried out in a manner commensurate with the gravity of the offence that Mr. Dowa is alleged to have committed.” To begin with, there is no provision in CAT for a State Party to have an alleged perpetrator removed from its jurisdiction unless it is in pursuance of a bona fide extradition request from another State Party.60 Zimbabwe has not ratified CAT, nor did it seek to extradite Dowa. Far from the UN having correctly focused on Zimbabwe as having in all the circumstances “the legal responsibility,” it is highly questionable whether the UN had the right under CAT to transfer its obligations to another country (Zimbabwe) in the absence of a genuine extradition request. As REDRESS said at the time, it appeared as if the UN had itself failed to comply with its own treaty.61 Furthermore, even within the constraints of international diplomacy and realpolitik, it is at best naïve if not entirely disingenuous to regard the Zimbabwe authorities as capable of mounting an impartial investigation and prosecution. The letter did not purport to offer any legal basis for the decision to ‘neither extradite nor prosecute’: pragmatism simply rode roughshod over legality.62 By opting for this ‘unique solution’ has the UN not set a precedent for State Parties to find an unwritten exception hidden somewhere in CAT? After all, many State Parties have heavy burdens on their judicial machinery; what is to stop them sending home alleged foreign torturers found within their jurisdictions if another State Party does not quickly seek to extradite? As a Zimbabwe journalist put it: 60 Articles 5 (2) and 7 (1); see above, page 7. Press statement issued on 1 October 2003; see http://www.redress.org The same point was made in REDRESS’ letter of reply to Jean-Marie Guehenno of DPKO dated 24 September 2003: “It is our strong view that to designate the responsibility for this case to the Zimbabwean courts under current conditions goes against Kosovo’s obligations under the Torture Convention, and particularly Article 5 (2), which clearly sets out the obligation to investigate and prosecute in the absence of an extradition request. In this context we question whether the UN has the option under the Convention to transfer its obligations to another country unless a bona fide extradition request has been made.” No reply was received. 62 The obligation to provide an effective remedy for violations of human rights, including torture, is set out in Article 2 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Zimbabwe ratified on 13 May 1991. Zimbabwe is of course also subject to all the norms of customary international law, including those which have been recognized as governing human rights which have developed under the auspices of the UN since World War II. However, the whole corpus of international law cannot be used to side step the clear provisions of CAT, especially and directly by the UN itself, let alone by a State Party. 61 13