Executive summary Realizing that the current constitution of Zimbabwe is flawed in many respects and has contributed to the crisis in Zimbabwe, the parties to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) agreed to embark on a process of developing a new constitution that would address some of the critical contributing factors to the Zimbabwe crisis. As prescribed under Article 6 of the GPA, a parliamentary select committee on the new constitution (COPAC) was established to drive this process. Given that COPAC has now produced a draft constitution, the question that is asked by many Zimbabweans as well as the regional and international community, is how far does this draft constitution seek to address some of the major constitutional issues that are at the center of the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe? These constitutional issues include the absence of a legal framework that effectively promotes the observance of human rights, ineffective separation of powers, excessive and unchecked presidential authority, over centralization of power in the national government as well as absence of free and fair elections. Addressing these issues is not entirely dependent on a good constitution alone, but the political will to implement that constitution to its letter and spirit. The question of the day, however, is whether the draft produced by COPAC adequately responds to these issues. Overally, this proposed draft constitution is better than the current constitution of Zimbabwe. It is a step forward in the process of building democracy in Zimbabwe as it captures the critical aspect of separation of powers, embodies the culture of fundamental rights, constitutionalism as well as limited presidential authority. Presidential Authority: The draft constitution introduces a new era where the president no longer enjoys any unwritten (prerogative) powers but will only exercise those powers that are given by the constitution and legislation. This creates certainty as to what exactly is the limitation of presidential powers in Zimbabwe. By getting rid of the president’s powers to directly appoint individuals into the senate, the draft creates an opportunity for the legislature to make laws and exercise its oversight duties independent of the executive or the president. Through a tremendous reduction of the president’s influence over the appointment of the members of Judiciary Services Commission (JSC), this draft constitution presents an opportunity for the appointment of an impartial JSC which in turn will appoint impartial judges and members of the prosecuting authority. In a significant way, this presents an opportunity for judiciary independence and observance of rule of law in Zimbabwe. However, the fact that the president retains the authority to handpick members of the tribunal to investigate the conduct of a sitting judge threatens the security of tenure of the judiciary and can be used to undermine the independence of the judiciary. Thus, the president will continue to enjoy unchecked powers in the process of dismissing judges while the parliament will not have an effective role to play in the process of appointing judges. Furthermore, the draft also presents an opportunity for provincial governments to develop and implement policies independent of the president or the executive since the president will no longer have power to directly appoint provincial governors. Under the current law, the president handpicks provincial governors and these governors merely function as representatives of the president in the provinces rather than being heads of provincial governments. Even though the draft leaves the 3