excessive power to dominate the appointment procedure, and if the result of the process is a truly independent body of well qualified women and men who can be trusted to undertake their responsibilities in utmost good faith. The appointment procedure must not only be seen to achieve this aim but must obviously achieve it. It would also be dangerous if a new Government blithely stated that there was no need for any fresh legislation at all, and that the whole issue of human rights abuses could be dealt with under the Commission of Inquiries Act (Chapter 10:07). Zimbabweans know only too well how this procedure has been abused and manipulated in the past. Where things were found not to the Government’s liking it simply never made the results public, as with the inquiries in the 1980s relating to the Gukurahundi; more recently, the 1999 Constitutional Commission was not only heavily loaded with Government supporters all appointed solely by the President, but even then he unilaterally and substantially altered their recommendations. What is needed is a system of initial nominations from a variety of sources, including any new Government, but also from other sectors of the nation such as civil society, churches, and tradeunions. The statute should set out the qualities required for nomination, going considerably further than generalizations about persons being of good character. It is submitted, therefore, that civil society should begin categorizing what qualities will be needed for appointment as a commissioner so that it can lobby for these specific qualifications to be spelled out in the future enabling legislation. For example, does civil society view it to be essential for all or some commissioners to have a genuine background in human rights work, or medical expertise? To what extent should gender balance or racial, ethnic or regional balance be taken into account? Another area is the selection procedure itself. How open should the selection process be? 13