Another theory is that the clean-up operation was a type of pre-emptive strike against the urban poor. According to this theory, the Government, fearful of massive unrest and even a possible uprising, decided to strike first to smash, or irreparably weaken, all possible sources of mass protest. It did so by rendering many urban poor homeless, thereby forcing them to return to their rural homes, which would remove their ability to engage in any dangerous mass protest. Certainly the huge scale armed force deployed during Operation Murambatsvina was indicative either of a ruthless determination to carry through the programme, or a fear that the devastation would lead to a spontaneous uprising on the part of those affected. There are also a number of theories regarding what underlies the decimation of informal trading. Some argue that the Government is deliberately destroying informal “flea markets” in order to tighten its control of the economy. The informal sector has contributed little to the fiscus by way of licence fees or through taxation, and, hence, by destroying the current largely uncontrolled informal economy and replacing with a trading and vending sector that is tightly controlled by Government, it can ensure that licences are allocated to party loyalists. At the least, direct political pressure can be put upon licensees to conform to the norms expected by the ruling party. It can also ensure that it has control over the foreign currency generated by informal trading, and stamps out black market trading in foreign currency by this sector. A spin-off of the dispossession of people occupying informal settlements is that these plots can be re-allocated to ruling party loyalists . This process has already commenced. In the main, Government-controlled, daily newspaper, 39 it was reported that at least 20 000 residential stands and several thousands of vending stalls would be allocated in Harare, with civil servants, the army, air force, police, prison service, and intelligence service personnel being the biggest beneficiaries. 40 As has been seen, each of these theories has some support, but also there are problems with each too. It should be remembered here that similar fragmentary theorising followed the land invasions in 2000, and, in retrospect, it was possible to see that this strategy was more comprehensive than any of the single theories advanced. Thus, some have advanced a more complex theory than those outlined above. Firstly, it is evident, and was evident before the election, that the ZANU (PF) Government faced two major political problems, and these both related to the Government’s pressing need to overcome its international political and economic isolation. The first problem may be termed the “illegitimacy” problem, and this arises from the repudiation of election results by domestic and international observers - with the consequent refusal by a substantial portion of the world to recognise the ZANU (PF) Government as legitimate. The second problem may be termed the “governance” problem, and this revolves around the suppression of the media, the breaches of the rule of law, human rights violations, and the existence and application of draconian legislation. The second problem has also resulted in international opprobrium, and led directly to withdrawal of donor support and the support of the international finance institutions. It is just possible that ZANU (PF) has resolved the ”illegitimacy” problem in the recently completed election. This is not to support the notion that the election was won fairly; far from it, since there is strong evidence that a massive campaign of intimidation was mounted, especially at the seats won by the MDC in the 2000 Parliamentary election . 41