no further than allowing Ministers to fill in details in Acts, for example specifying forms to be used in applications, etc. In addition, the new constitution should require the President and Ministers to consult widely with interested parties before making regulations; at the very least this may improve the efficacy of their regulations. 3. Power over the Judiciary (a) Power to appoint judicial officers Appointment of judges - under the present Constitution, the President appoints judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission; he does not have to take the Commission’s advice, but if he goes against it the Senate must be informed [though the Senate cannot compel him to revoke appointments made contrary to the Commission’s recommendation]. Judicial officers presiding over specialised courts such as the Administrative Court and the Labour Court are similarly appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission — though there is no provision for the Senate to be informed if the President goes against the Commission’s advice. Since the inception of the GPA, the President has, at least in theory, had to get the Prime Minister to agree to judicial appointments. For all practical purposes this obligation to consult or agree is impossible to enforce. Appointment of magistrates – magistrates, the workhorses of the judicial system, are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission under the Magistrates Court Act. The Judicial Service Commission itself is composed entirely of presidential appointees, though again, since the GPA came into force, the President has had to get, again in theory, the Prime Minister’s approval for these appointments. It is therefore fair to say that all judicial officers in Zimbabwe owe their appointment, directly or indirectly, to the President. In view of this it is no surprise that the judiciary has been regarded as unduly submissive towards the Executive; the only surprise is that it ever showed any independence. This is a most unsatisfactory position because an independent judiciary is one of the pillars of a free and democratic State. To ensure judicial independence, the new constitution must remove or dilute presidential involvement in the appointment of judicial officers and Judicial Service Commission members. This could be done by: • requiring judges to be selected by the Judicial Service Commission through an open process involving the publication of clear guidelines for the selection of candidates and the ratification of appointments by Parliament; • making an all-party committee of Parliament responsible for selecting all or most of the members of the Judicial Service Commission, again through an open process involving the publication of clear guidelines for selection. The current Supreme Court and High Court judges should be required to go through the new selection process if they are to retain their posts under the new Constitution. (b) Power to control judicial conduct The present Constitution goes some way towards ensuring judicial independence, that is limiting the Executive’s influence over the way in which judicial officers decide cases. It states that members of the judiciary are not subject to anyone’s direction or control when exercising their judicial authority and that a judge’s office cannot be 39