A.   THE  2018  ELECTIONS  AND  THEIR  AFTERMATH     1.   Introduction     After  the  coup  in  November  2017,  a  central  part  of  the  coup  leader’s  strategy  was  to  move  beyond   the  shadow  of  the  coup  through  an  election  process  that  was  seen  to  be  peaceful  and  credible.    As   the  Presidential  spokesperson  explained  it,  for  ED  Mnangagwa  and  his  team  July  30  ‘was  not  about   winning  votes  qua  votes,  but  about  securing  re-­‐engagement  and  the  myriad  benefits  flowing   therefrom’.1  Thus  this  ‘open  for  business’  mantra  was  accompanied  by  selective  electoral  reforms.   These  included:  The  introduction  of  the  BVR  voting  system;  the  ensuring  of  a  more  peaceful  and   tolerant  electoral  environment;  and  an  invitation  to  a  wide  range  of  international  observers   including  the  EU,  US,  SADC,  AU,  and  the  Commonwealth  to  monitor  and  report  on  the  election.   As  part  of  the  narrative  of  international  re-­‐engagement,  national  unity  and  reconciliation  that   marked  his  discourse  since  the  coup,  Mnangagwa  also  conducted  a  series  of  meetings  with  minority   communities.  In  June,  Chiwenga  met  with  the  Asian  business  community,  and  In  July  the  Zanu  PF   President  met  with  the  representatives  of  the  white  community  and  invoked  the  language  of   reconciliation  that  Mugabe  deployed  in  the  immediate  post  1980  period:     We  should  cease  to  talk  about  who  owns  farms  in  terms  of  colour.  We  should  cease  talking   about  that.  A  farmer-­‐black  farmer,  a  white  farmer-­‐is  a  Zimbabwean  farmer.  We  should   begin  to  develop  a  culture  among  our  people  to  accept  that  we  are  one.2                       The  opposition,  led  by  the  largest  party  the  MDC  Alliance  and  its  young  leader  Nelson  Chamisa,   made  it  clear  from  early  on  in  its  election  campaign  that  there  were  serious  problems  in  the   election  process  that  had  not  been  dealt  with.  The  problem  areas  included  the  partisan  status  of   the  Zimbabwe  Election  Commission,  the  late  release  of  the  voter’s  role,  lack  of  transparency  around   the  printing  of  the  ballot  papers,  and  the  lack  of  equal  access  to  the  public  media.  Moreover   Chamisa  stated  throughout  his  campaign  that  his  party  would  not  accept  any  result  other  than  his   Presidential  victory.  In  addition  to  these  challenges  the  opposition  was  also  caught  up  in  the   outcome  of  a  bitter  succession  battle  after  the  death  of  Morgan  Tsvangirai  which  resulted  in  yet   another  split  in  the  MDC.  Chamisa’s  victory  over  Thoko  Khupe  in  a  political  battle  marred  by   violence,  misogyny  and,  at  the  very  least,  a  questionable  constitutionality,  once  again  marred  the   image  of  the  opposition.                 Notwithstanding  the  differences  between  the  two  major  parties  their  election  manifestos   converged  around  the  need  for  macro-­‐economic  stabilisation  and  market-­‐based  reforms.  Both   were  competing  for  international  financial  approval  and  investment  promises.                                                                                                                   1  Under  the  Eaves  with  Igomombe,  ‘Zimbabweans  armed  with  ideas’.  Herald,  1  September  2018.    ED  meets  White  Community.  Sunday  Mail,  22  July  2018.  ZBC,  “We  are  all  Zimbabweans,  VP  tells  Indian  community”,  8   July  2018.       2   3