A related, and even more interesting argument is that unrestricted state subsidies infringe on the autonomy of political parties. Political parties are normally formed freely and on any basis and being state-funded, it is contended, raises the unappetising prospect of political parties that are dependent on the state, which further raises the prospect that ‘who pays the piper calls the tune.’ This will then raise the spectre of the very unwholesome symbiotic relationship that existed between the Nazi party and the state during the Hitler era. To be sure, a partial public financing of the parties through yearly or monthly payments for their entire political activity might not necessarily incorporate the parties into the state’s organizational sphere, but it would entangle them in it and render the parties dependent upon state support. Supporters of state subsidies to political parties argue that if voting is a constitutional right, then the state must be compelled to subsidise the assertion of a constitutional rights. Their argument goes like this: “Since the holding of elections is a public function and the parties have a decisive role to play in the electoral process under the constitution, it must be permissible for the state to make financial resources available not only for the elections themselves but also for the political parties that sustain them” (Currie 1994, 212). On one hand, the assertion goes, state subsidies can pose a significant threat to freedom; on the other, they may be necessary to make freedom a reality. In Germany, the state-funding issue has triggered intriguing philosophical and legal questions that have been brought before the Constitutional Court. State subsidies for political parties, the Court once concluded, not only abridged the freedom of the parties themselves under Article 21 (1); they also offended the provision of Article 20 (2) that “all state authority emanates from the people” (Currie 1994, 211). Political parties, the Court seemed to be saying, were the indispensable instrument through which the people asserted their prerogative to determine the actions of public authority. Government assistance, by weakening the parties’ dependence on the people, thus impaired the people’s right to exercise their sovereign powers. In 1992, the Constitutional Court decision ruled as follows: The freedom of parties from the state posited by the Basic Law requires not only that parties be independent of the state itself but also that they retain their identity as freely constituted associations rooted in the social and political sphere. The parties must remain dependent upon citizen approval and support not only politically but economically and organisationally as well. Public funds thus may not be permitted to liberate individual parties from the risk of failure of their efforts to obtain sufficient support from the voters. In short, the argument is against unrestricted grants to political parties not disavowing them completely. The weight of the argument is towards targeted state funding, i.e. that the state could provide financial support to parties in order to cover the necessary costs of an appropriate electoral campaign – not to subsidize the activities of the parties in their entirety. State financing of political parties must be sharp and targeted instrument for legitimate electoral activities. In this vein, since elections are indubitably public functions, they deserve public funding; however, such funding for non-electoral activities becomes impermissible. This then immediately raises the question of disclosure and accountability for the public funds disbursed. It has been argued that permissible though it may be for developed countries to subsidize political parties, it is morally reprehensible to do so in developing countries afflicted by the economics of scarcity. This school of thought argues that there are other worthier sectors that desperately need the money, e.g. education, health, infrastructure etc than creating another “gravy train��� for politicians. This was the argument passionately advanced by one vocal and now late ruling party MP, Lazarus Nzarayebani during parliamentary debate on the Political Parties (Finance) Bill in 1994: May I say from the onset that this is a bad law. I say this with all sincerity, with all my heart and conscience put together. My concern is, as an hon. Member that we have no money. At least I am well informed that we have unbearable debts internally and externally and our ability to service these debts is not just there. I am a cadre of this party and I am well disciplined, I suppose. I know that the party 11