 the nature and extent of the limitation;  the need to ensure that the exercise of the right does not prejudice the rights of others;  the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and  whether there are less restrictive means of achieving the purposes of the limitation. In re Munhumeso & Others 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) at 64B-C the court pointed out that: “What is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society is an elusive concept – one which cannot be precisely defined by the courts. There is no legal yardstick save that the quality of reasonableness of the provision under challenge is to be judged according to whether it arbitrarily or excessively invades the enjoyment of a constitutionally guaranteed right.” In Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority & Another 1995 (2) ZLR 1 (S) at 13C-F, GUBBAY CJ elaborated the test as follows: “In effect the court will consider three criteria in determining whether or not the limitation is permissible in the sense of not being shown to be arbitrary or excessive. It will ask itself whether: 1. the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; 2. the measures designed to meet the legislative object are rationally connected to it; and 3. the means used to impair the right or freedom are no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.” Section 86 of Zimbabwe’s Constitution is headed “Limitation of Rights and Freedoms” (emphasis added). The word “limitation” also appears in the substantive portion of that section. According to the Oxford English Dictionary “limit” means “confining within limits, set bounds to, restrict.” It is clear, therefore, that section 86 does not authorize the state to “eliminate” rights contained in the Declaration of Rights or to “hollow out such rights, so that they no longer have any meaningful content.” Thus, the power to limit rights does not go beyond the power to restrict rights. Writing about the limitation provision in the Canadian Charter of Rights, Peter Hogg (2003:35-10) says that “… not every Charter infringement is a ‘limit’, and any infringement that is more severe than a limit cannot be justified.” In Ford v Attorney-General Quebec [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 772 the Canadian Supreme Court drew a distinction between “the negation of a right or freedom and a limit on it.” (A similar approach was put forward in an earlier Canadian case, Attorney General Quebec v Quebec Protestant School Boards [1984] 2 SCR 66 at 88). Thus the courts must uphold the fundamental right to demonstrate and any limitations upon this right must be reasonable and must not take away completely or eliminate the right or remove the essential core of the right. In this regard the Constitution in section 46 (1) (c) provides that our courts “must take into account international law and all treaties and conventions to which Zimbabwe is a party.” Zimbabwe is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which guarantees various rights including freedom of assembly (Article 21). The Human Rights Committee established in terms of Article 28 of this Covenant has commented upon what