I do not believe they are ever introduced into any statute by which any particular crime is defined.’ In Sherras v De Rutzen [1895] 1 QB 918, 921 Wright J held: "There is a presumption that mens rea, an evil intention, or a knowledge of the wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals . . ." He then went on to give examples of regulatory provisions which excluded the presumption of mens rea. In Brend v Wood (1946) 62 TLR 462 Lord Goddard CJ re-stated the rule, at p 463: ‘It should first be observed that at common law there must always be mens rea to constitute a crime; if a person can show that he acted without mens rea that is a defence to a criminal prosecution. There are statutes and regulations in which Parliament has seen fit to create offences and make people responsible before criminal Courts although there is an absence of mens rea, but it is certainly not the Court's duty to be acute to find that mens rea is not a constituent part of the crime. It is of the utmost importance for the protection of the liberty of the subject that a Court should always bear in mind that unless a statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, the Court should not find a man guilty of an offence against the criminal law unless he has a guilty mind.’ …” Thus, in defilement matters, the strict liability nature renders criminal intention (mens rea) irrelevant, but the statutory defence to defilement becomes the exception, inbuilt in the statute itself – a defence that can be raised to negate criminal intention. The protection in section 70 of the Criminal Code is that a minor’s consent is vitiated by virtue of her age. The statutory defence on the other hand, does not detract from the child’s presumed inability to consent, but rather deals with the reasonable belief of the accused as to the age of the girl. This distinction is important and therefore must be emphasised. Thus, in the Malawian case of Republic v Goliat and Jonasi [1971 – 72] ALR (MW) 251 at page 252, Chatsika J stated as follows: “It must be stated quite clearly, lest there be some misunderstanding, that consent of the complainant provides no defence to a charge of defilement. A girl who is under the age of 13 is not capable of giving that consent. Be that as it may, the question of consent may be taken into account in considering the sentence”. This was before the 2011 amendments to the statute that raised the age to sixteen. This case is critical for yet another reason: consent, though presumed a nullity by virtue of age, is taken as a mitigatory factor. In addressing the ground of appeal of whether the sentences passed by the trial court were manifestly excessive, the Malawian High Court in Kayira v S [2015] MWHC 432 took note of the fact that the Appellant and the victim were in a consensual sexual relationship and, therefore, the Court decided to reduce the sentences. Madise J at paragraphs 8.3 said: 29