However, a notable lack of political will has resulted in the absence of prosecution: on the 800 cases for further investigation and possible prosecution to the National Prosecuting Authority (which had established a special unit for this purpose in 2004), only one or two isolated cases were dealt with and sparked controversy.37In May 2002, 33 prisoners were “granted a presidential pardon for their role in the South African freedom struggle”; among them, some had seen their application for amnesty rejected by the TRC.38 This lead to a general impunity and to a de facto blanket amnesty: even perpetrators who did not benefit the amnesty were not tried. Finally, not all the truth emerged and the objective to achieve national reconciliation was, as a result, seriously undermined.39 • Lessons learned A strong criminal process was necessary to encourage perpetrators to apply for amnesty. Indeed, according to Jonathan Klaaren and Howard Vamey40, the threat of prosecution would have encouraged perpetrators to speak and expose the truth in exchange for amnesty: most of the perpetrators knowing that there was no real threat to be prosecuted by the judicial system, did not come up with the truth. Moreover, most of those who spoke to the TRC only gave information that was already known by the investigators and prosecutors and did not say anything about facts they were sure the investigators and prosecutors ignored41. Finally, the authors found that the PNUR Act contained details permitting leader of organization to escape the process. Indeed, section 20(6) mentions “sufficient information to identify the act, omission or offence in respect of which amnesty has been granted”42. Yet, many leaders or organizations did not know about the specific violations committed by their subordinates and so would not speak given that they were not entitled to amnesty. Furthermore, even when they were sufficiently aware of crimes committed under their command, many leaders would not speak because they feared civil claims and criminal prosecutions against them based on elements they knew about but which were not covered by amnesty. 4. Amnesty in Zimbabwe: Can it Work? In 2013, Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution, which establishes a National Peace and Reconciliation Commission (NPRC), with it becoming an Act of Parliament on 18 December 2015. The NPRC has only made very limited achievement so far as the country remained divided on political and ethnic lines. However, with the removal of Mugabe as president in 2017, there are opportunities to reconcile the country. The challenges that ensued the elections of 2018 points at the need for immediate action to be taken to set the country on the right track in strengthening its democratic institutions. Such actions should focus on the need for justice, healing, and reconciliation across the country, with all relevant actors fully integrated into the process. 37 Ibid Ross, Joanna. “SA amnesty raises storm”, BBC News, 19 May 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1997262.stm 39 "A second bite at the amnesty cherry? Constitutional and policy issues around legislation for a second amnesty ", Jonathan Klaaren and Howard Vamey, in South African Law Journal; 117; 572-593; South African law jounral JUTA; 2000 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, 1995, No.34 of 1995, article 20 (6), available at : https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/Act34of1995.pdf 38 8