APCJ_1528_Win2010_00i_122_4 12/30/10 3:22 PM Page 97 Darfur, Grand Conflict: Inter-Communal Rift and Grass-root Initiatives 97 the smallest of needed items at the risk of being attacked by bandits and robbers.30 Some enterprising pastoralists turned into traders themselves and began bringing goods and commodities into their areas for sale to compensate for the loss of village markets and shops. The disruption of transport, protection fees, and risk of robbery, however, have all contributed to the persistence of shortages, problematic access, and high prices. The estimated price increases of some commodities indicate the scope of the problem before and after the start of the grand conflict in 2003. Based on numerous field visits, a Darfuri researcher estimated that in rural North Darfur the price of a pound of sugar increased from 1,500 Sudanese pounds to 6,000 (300 percent), a bottle of oil from 2,000 Sudanese pounds to 8,000 (300 percent), and a sack of grain from 45,000 Sudanese pounds to 150,000 (230 percent).31 As the security situation worsened, commodity prices tended to skyrocket across rural Darfur, with pastoralists suffering the most. The desertion of peasant villages also eroded pastoralists’ livelihoods by undermining their economy and damaging their cash-earning capacity. Village markets were the primary setting in the livestock-marketing chain where pastoralists sold livestock for cash to traders, who then herded them to urban centers, where they were slaughtered or transported to the main markets in central Sudan or for export.32 Thus the post2003 violence and insecurity disrupted the livestock market. Few traders in rural Darfur dared venture to engage in the livestock trade because of the risk of loss. The abandonment of farming also deprived pastoralists of crop residues, which before the grand conflict provided fodder for livestock. This affected animal health, milk productivity, and cash income, which dropped for pastoralists who sold milk in large quantities for processing into white sour cheese. For example, the milk that pastoralists around Zalengie sold for processing for the Nyala market dropped dramatically and, along with it, so did the pastoralists’ income. Villages also offered diversification for cash income opportunities that helped support pastoralists’ livelihoods. Using camels, some pastoralists earned money by transporting peasants’ crops from farms to villages and from villages to markets. Income was also generated through the sale of handicrafts and animal products, such as milk, gee, and sour milk, to peasant villagers.33 Thus pastoralists were deprived of complementary cash income when the villages were emptied of their peasant inhabitants.34 A lack of access to humanitarian food relief made pastoralists’ food (in)security situation even worse. Unlike the displaced peasant communities—the direct victims of Darfur’s violence who gathered in camps in tens of thousands—pastoralists remained scattered over a relatively wide rural area. While the former were visible and accessible to humanitarian agencies, the latter were almost invisible because they did not 30. One source stated that pastoralists have to travel eighteen to twenty kilometres to get salt, soap, or matches. Informal interview, Mohamed Salah, field officer for the Food and Agriculture Organization, Nyala, July 2006. 31. Interview, Abdel Gabar A Fadl. 32. Abdel Rahman Hamid et al., ‘Markets, livelihoods and food aid in Darfur: A rapid assessment and programming recommendations’, European Union, Food and Agriculture Organization, and United States Agency for International Development, Khartoum, 2005, 28, 48, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE 802.pdf. 33. Food and Agriculture Organization, ‘Nomads in North Darfur’, unpublished draft report, Nyala, n.d. 34. Hamid et al., ‘Markets, livelihoods and food aid in Darfur’, 21–24.