5 • • • • • • association with groups closely affiliated to the ZanuPF political party – “war veterans”, youth militia, ZanuPF youth, ZanuPF supporters, ZanuPF party officials, etc ; The evidence shows that plausible allegations can made for the involvement of senior party and government leaders, and there are many statements from victims implicating such persons; The evidence suggests that a strong case can be made for a planned strategy using militia. Firstly, the “war veterans” were deployed to manage the farm invasions and the Parliamentary Elections, and, secondly, a youth militia cadre was developed and deployed initially for the Presidential Election, but have subsequently been deployed all around the country. The evidence available shows a very strong association between the youth militia and torture, and it is not contested that there are training camps for the youth militia or that government funds have been allocated to such training; There is no or very little evidence, of any attempt by the executive or organs of the State to proactively deal with the violence; The evidence suggests, to the contrary, that there an enormous number of examples of hate speech, and encouragement to violence and lawlessness by virtually all members of the executive, the parliament, the party, and the supporters of the ZanuPF party; There is strong evidence for severe interference by the State, state officials, and ZanuPF supporters, with the judiciary, magistrates and law officers, including the ignoring of High Court and Supreme Court judgements and orders ; There is finally the promulgation of two Presidential amnesties - in 2000 and again in 2002 – which must raise strong suspicion that the State wishes to avoid guilt for its actions since these amnesties provided impunity for all the crimes of torture. These conclusions are extended by a more recent report that argues that the organized violence and torture in Zimbabwe are more related to elections than to inter-party political violence or violence due to the “land invasions”4. Thus, it is scarcely surprising that ordinary Zimbabweans are cautious and even afraid to express their opinions, and are likely to portray a non-partisan position in respect of party politics and elections. The third conclusion, which relates to press freedom and access to information, is argued by the Afrobarometer survey in 2004 to account for most of the variance in explaining the apparent paradox of Robert Mugabe increasing in popularity since 1999. The imposition of draconian legislation and attacks on the press and journalists in Zimbabwe needs little discussion, and has had exceedingly wide coverage over the past 5 years. However, as the Afrobarometer survey demonstrates, the propaganda linking land and the liberation struggle has had a powerful effect on the attitudes of ordinary Zimbabweans, and not only on Zimbabweans, as one respected commentator has pointed out5. In this linkage, a crucial component has been the re-definition of “citizenship”, with the creation of insider and outsider groups, where the latter are presented in the media as largely belonging to the MDC, and hence are “sell-outs”, “agents of imperialism”, “people without totems”, and a plethora of other pejorative terms. There is no middle ground in this highly polarised political space that is Zimbabwe6. The fourth conclusion, the desire for inter-party dialogue, is now wholly overtaken by events. Whilst there were some signs, in 2003 and early 2004, that serious talks might take place, this is now wholly off the agenda of the ZanuPF government, and the focus is exclusively upon elections. Any chance that ordinary citizens had of representing their views through feed-in to inter-party discussions have disappeared, and 4 See Redress Trust (2004), ZIMBABWE. TORTUOUS PATTERNS DESTINED TO REPEAT THEMSELVES IN UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN. Preliminary Study of Trends and Associations in the Pattern of Torture and Organised Violence in Zimbabwe, July 2001 - December 2003, LONDON: REDRESS TRUST. 5 See Raftopoulos, B (2004), Nation, race and history in Zimbabwean politics (www.kubatana.net) 6 See again A. Hammar, & B. Raftopoulos (2004), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis, HARARE: WEAVER PRESS. IDASA: Zimbabwe at the Cross-Roads: Views of Zimbabwean citizens on democracy and transitional justice.