15 Later in the month, a mob of approximately 80 Zanu (PF) supporters attacked the house of an MDC supporter in the area. The owner reported thousands of dollars worth of damage. The rhetoric during this time was consistent and violent. Zanu (PF) supporters told Chikomba residents repeatedly during public speeches that there would be severe retribution if they did not support the ruling party. Up to the day of the election, ZESN and ESC monitors were sometimes detained by local militias and were accused of being MDC members. By election day, Chikomba had descended from an area with a significant possibility for free and fair conditions into a virtual war zone. Many residents had fled the constituency or gone into hiding. Others were subjected to repeated threats if they supported an opposition party. Many experienced assaults and torture to coerce them into supporting the ruling party. Not surprisingly Zanu (PF) won the bye-election by a margin of 71 per cent to 23 per cent. Overall they gained 10 percentage points while the MDC lost 7 per cent compared to the June 2000 elections. While the total number of votes was nearly identical to the previous poll, 2,500 more people registered to vote bringing the total to 52 774. 40 With a rise in violence it could be expected that many opposition supporters decided to stay home. That being the case such a significant increase in the total number of votes by Zanu (PF) reflects the efforts undertaken by the ruling party to get the vote at any cost. The ruling party’s efforts appeared to have paid off. Nonetheless, given the levels of violence and intimidation the bye-election cannot be seen as free and fair. The entire constituency was operating in a state of fear and threats of retribution for supporting the opposition were rampant. It is unclear why Zanu (PF) departed so severely from their initial peaceful statements but once they did, they ensured a victory at all costs. 7. Conclusions As will be seen from the summaries above, a clear pattern emerges in respect of all the byeelections. The pattern is little different from that observed in the June 2000 Parliamentary Elections, showing significant violence, vote-buying through selective distribution of development funds (but perhaps on a far greater scale), voter intimidation, and a highly partisan role on the part of the Electoral Supervisory Commission. The findings of the AMANI Trust were corroborated by other organizations, and, in particular, the findings of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN). It is evident that the MDC found it difficult to campaign in most constituencies. This was overcome to some extent by the deployment of MDC youth groups in the early bye-elections, but it became clear in the Bikita bye-election that these groups became special targets for the violence. In subsequent bye-elections, the reliance by the MDC upon youth cadres seemed to diminish, most probably because these youth seemed to attract such violence. This is not to suggest that the MDC youth were blameless in the violence in the two early elections – Marondera West and Bikita West – but the evidence does not support the view that they were the major perpetrators. In both these two bye-elections, and, in all the subsequent bye-elections, supporters of Zanu (PF) were the overwhelmingly perpetrators of organised violence and torture. Perpetrators according to case reports. War veterans Zanu (PF) youth Zanu (PF) supporters ZRP CIO ZNA MDC Unknown 40 19% 8% 35% 14% 10% 1% 2% 11% See ZESN (2001), Chikomba Constituency By-election, HARARE: ZESN AMANI TRUST: Organised Violence and Torture in the Bye-Elections held in Zimbabwe during 2000 and 2001.