Judgment No. CCZ 11/14 4 Constitutional Application No. CCZ 4/13 I will deal with the second ground first. The submission that a complainant’s representation to the Attorney-General to reconsider his decision in a criminal matter is unconstitutional and violates the accused’s right to protection of the law as it undermines the independence of the Attorney-General is misconceived. A complainant in a criminal matter has a substantial interest in the prosecution of an accused. In my view, a complainant is perfectly entitled to make representations to the Attorney-General regarding such prosecution. The Attorney-General is not bound to accept such representations. He can either accept or reject such representations depending on whether or not he finds merit in the representations. In terms of the law, where the Attorney-General does not accept the representations the complainant is entitled to a certificate of nolle prosequi – see s 13, as read with s 16, of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:02]. The mere fact that representations have been made does not in any way interfere with the independence of the Attorney-General, who is free to accept or dismiss such representations. In fact this submission is as absurd as submitting that the Court’s independence is compromised by submissions by counsel. This ground of challenge therefore fails. I now turn to the first ground of challenge, namely the alleged inordinate delay in bringing this matter to trial. This Court has dealt with applications for stay of prosecution on the grounds of inordinate delay in trying the accused on numerous occasions and the law is now well settled. In the leading case of In Re Mlambo 1991 (2) ZLR 339 (SC), this Court set out the procedure to be followed and the factors that a court takes into account in deciding whether the applicant’s right to a fair trial within a reasonable time has