Judgment No. CCZ 11/15 6 Const. Application No. CCZ 28/11 The respondent contends that, contrary to the applicant’s assertions in this respect, s 182 (1) of the Code complied with each of the requirements of permissible legislative limitation of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. He submits that the questions to be posed in this respect are defined as follows in the case of Retrofit (Private) Limited v Posts and Telecommunications and Anor2; Is the restriction on the exercise of the right of freedom of expression imposed under s 182(1) of the Criminal Code contained in law? 1) If yes, does the provision have as its primary objective the protection of a public interest in one or more of the matters listed in s 20(2)(a) of the old Constitution? 2) If the protection of a public interest listed in s 20(2)(a) is the primary purpose of the legislation, is there a rational connection between the restriction and the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the objective pursued? (in re Chinamasa, (supra); Chimakure and Others vs Attorney General (supra) The respondent then addresses each of these questions in relation to the case at hand and submits as follows in his Heads of Argument; “It is submitted that the restriction is contained in the law because it is provided for in s 182(1) of the Code. It is further submitted that indeed the offence of ‘contempt of court’ (“scandalising the court”) exists for purposes of protecting the administration of justice and is thus a permissible derogation from the freedom of expression. It is submitted, in answer to the last question, that there is a rational connection between the restriction on the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and the objective pursued. In other words the offence as provided for in s 182(1) of the Code was (reasonably) justifiable in a democratic society. There is need to protect the courts from being scandalised3” The respondent added that the words uttered in reference to the judiciary were clearly not “within the limits of reasonable courtesy and good faith”. In considering the lengthy submissions of the parties on this matter, I find that there is no dispute as to the content and purpose of the right to the freedom of expression that 2 3 1995(2) ZLR 199(S) at 220 See in this respect Nyambirai vs National Social Security Authority and Another, 1995 (2) ZLR (1) (S) at 13 D-F