forward to good governance, sensible economic policies, an end to corruption, and perhaps the opening of the political space, adherence to human rights, the opening of the media and press space, and so on. However, it is now clear that ZANU-PF will continue to govern until the next election. They have rejected all calls for inclusivity, and interpreted the incoherent support of the people as a mandate to do so, cushioned by the unwillingness of opposition political parties and other internal groups to challenge the assumption of power, and bolstered further by the unwillingness of the international community to call the coup a coup. The consequence will be that elections will happen, and ZANU-PF will win this election (because they always do). Here there have been less-than-reassuring indications with the resignation of the Chair of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and the continuance in office of the Registrar-General, Tobaiwa Mudede. The latter’s continuance reveals yet another contradiction: the Minister of Finance states that all civil servants will have to retire at 65, but another Minister states that we cannot discriminate against the elderly, and Mr Mudede is long past retirement age. We can only hope that this kind of policy incoherence, which was such a feature of the past years of Mugabe’s rule, will not become a feature of the new regime. The opposition parties seem too fragmented to offer a serious challenge (or expose the illegalities if these are present), and need rapidly to move beyond the rhetoric of alliance to the actuality of a real, policy-driven alliance and electoral pact. If not, then we can only hope that the dreams of the citizens on the streets two weeks ago will be met. We can hope that ZANU-PF is willing to reform internally and turn into a bona fide modern political party, as suggested by Emmerson Mnangagwa at the Extraordinary Congress. In general, and using a medical metaphor, this scenario is like hoping that the patient will heal him or herself, and generally this is the position of being unable to offer any treatment at all. Prayer might help, but little active intervention. The most serious implication is that, failing any challenge to the coup, the military will have a direct hold on the state, and in a way that has not been there so overtly before. It is almost impossible in the short-term to roll this back without massive internal and external pressure, which seems wholly lacking. Here it is worth reading Phillip Roessler’s piece in the Independent, which is also available on NewZimbabwe.com.12 This puts very succinctly the problem and why the AU (and SADC) are failing Zimbabwe. It also must be pointed out again that the lack of clarity by internal forces to call this a coup is allowing the externals to avoid this decision. The impact on civil society The first impact to consider is that, in the very short term, it is highly improbable that this election will be free or fair. When the military take charge of the state, this is exceedingly rarely the preliminary to establishing democratic rule. Consider the conditions at present. The chair of ZEC has resigned, the Registrar-General will remain, ―Command Agriculture‖ will be put in place, soldiers will be deployed to help with 12 How the African Union got it wrong on Zimbabwe, Phillip Roessler, NewZimbabwe, 5 December 2017. [http://www.newzimbabwe.com/opinion-40518-How+African+Union+got+it+wrong+on+Zim/opinion.aspx]