According to the Forum report, 98% of the cases of falanga took place in the rural areas, with the majority coming from one of the three Mashonaland Provinces, and, of these, Mashonaland Central accounting for over 50%. As was also reported in SPT2, much of the torture was carried out at places that are probably best described as torture centres, commonly known as “bases”. In the Forum report, 43% reported that their torture took place at a so-called ZANU PF “base” and a further 37% of the victims reported that their abuse took place at a public building. This is a repeated pattern in previous reports on torture99. Thus, it is evident that the use of falanga, mostly seen previously in cases of torture by the ZRP, has spread to non-state agents, and has been reported to have been increasingly perpetrated by non-state agents: as the Human Rights Forum reports, it is much more likely to have been carried out by members of ZANU PF youth than any other group. The only conclusion to be drawn here is that there has been instruction in the use of torture, and falanga in particular100. 5.4 Command responsibility Command responsibility, as indicated earlier, is an important issue in allegations of gross human rights violations and torture, and is crucial to any allegation of crimes against humanity. As was pointed out, allegations about command responsibility and state responsibility can draw on two sorts of evidence: evidence that an official of the state was directly involved in or ordered torture or some other gross human rights violation, or that an official or the state did not take steps to prevent such abuse or deal with the perpetration of this abuse. The record is clear on the 2008 period in respect of the latter. The state, its officials, and members of the government took no steps to prevent the violence, took no steps to react to the violence (even when the reports of the violence were so extreme that SADC had to intervene), and has subsequently made very poor efforts to investigate the reports and prosecute the offenders. This is common cause, and it is unnecessary to go into detail here. After all, the result of the Presidential run-off was rejected by the entire international community (with some notorious exceptions), and it is even conceded by ZANU PF, in the Global Political Agreement GPA], that it is necessary to investigate the violence of 2008101. However, the phrasing of the GPA is vague in respect of blame for the violence in 2008, stating this in general terms in Article 18: 18.1 Noting the easy resort to violence by political parties, State actors, Non-State actors and others in order to resolve political differences and achieve political ends. 18.2 Gravely concerned by the displacement of scores of people after the election of March 29, 2008 as a result of politically motivated violence. This generality, necessary as it might be to draft a political agreement, is wholly at variance with the facts, as has been seen above, and makes no reference to any of the violence that accompanied the previous seven years, or the elections in 2000 and 2002. As was seen in the analysis of those two previous elections, state officials, the ZRP, the ZNA, and even members of Parliament were alleged to have been involved in the perpetration of gross human rights violations and torture. In the examination of the reports relating to 2008, similar allegations can be made. Firstly, the enormous increase in reports alleging the involvement of the ZNA demonstrates that the state was directly involved in the commission of the crimes reported. Serving army officers do not normally participate in election campaigning on behalf of a political party, let alone lead and control violence, without the command structure of the army being involved. If the ZANU PF government tried to claim that all these personnel had taken leave and were acting in their private capacity, this argument would fail for the obvious reason that, once the reports emerged of military involvement in political violence, there is no evidence that the military hierarchy took any steps to correct the situation. SPT1, in an appendix, even provides evidence of military involvement with a key informant interview on the strategy developed by JOC for the Presidential runoff102. Secondly, the many reports of the use of state assets – vehicles, buildings, etc – also support the assertion that the government had at the very least condoned what was going on. For example, SPT2 (and the ZPP reports) indicate the widespread establishment of bases, and there are frequent references to bases, but no detailed analysis of these, their number, their geographical positioning, etc. See Solidarity Peace Trust (2006), Desperately Seeking Sanity: What Prospects for a New Beginning in Zimbabwe? 29 July 2008. DURBAN: SOLIDARITY PEACE TRUST; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum (2002), “Are They Accountable?: Examining alleged violators and their violations pre and post the Presidential Election March 2002”, HARARE: ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM; Reeler, A.P. (2003), The Perpetrators of Gross Human Rights Violations in Zimbabwe from February 2000 to March 2003, Paper presented to “Civil Society and Justice in Zimbabwe: A Symposium”, organised by the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Themba Le Sizwe and the International Bar Association, Holiday Inn, Johannesburg, 11-13 August 2003. 100 There have been frequent allegations that instruction in torture has taken place. Here see Solidarity Peace Trust (2003), National youth service training – “ shaping youths in a truly Zimbabwean manner”. An overview of youth militia training and activities in Zimbabwe, October 2000 – August 2003. 5 September, 2003. ZIMBABWE & SOUTH AFRICA: SOLIDARITY PEACE TRUST. 101 See ARTICLE XVIII. SECURITY OF PERSONS AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE ZIMBABWE AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION-PATRIOTIC FRONT (ZANU-PF) AND THE TWO MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC) FORMATIONS, ON RESOLVING THE CHALLENGES FACING ZIMBABWE. 102 There was also a document circulating amongst civic groups that purported to be a list of the army personnel involved and their areas of operation. However, this document has never been verified, and therefore can be no credibility. 99 Page 35