75 justifiable in a democratic society. S.C. 128\02 That is the issue which I should now determine by applying the test set out in Nyambirai’s case, supra. Are the legislative objectives sufficiently important to justify limiting the fundamental right to freedom of expression? The legislative objectives in respect of this provision are set out by the second respondent in his opposing affidavit as follows:- “I do not understand how the applicant or any other broadcaster will be prejudiced by this provision. If anything, it is extremely beneficial to them in that they are relieved of the huge expenditures involved in constructing broadcasting studios, acquiring and importing expensive antennas and transmitters, and employing staff on a permanent basis to maintain it. In the scenario envisaged by the Act, the signal carrier, will provide all the expensive aspects of broadcasting listed above, and will, in all probability, provide studios, cameras, etc. All the broadcaster will need to do is walk into an equipped studio, and commence broadcasting on the frequency allocated to them. This makes great economic sense both to the country and to the individual broadcaster. The country is spared the burden of repetitively buying and importing equipment using scarce foreign currency, and the individual broadcasting licensee enjoys the benefits of … low-cost broadcasting.” Thus, the main objectives given by the second respondent for the restrictive provision in s 9(3) are (1) to ensure low-cost broadcasting; and (2) to save foreign currency. It is pertinent to note that s 9(3) imposes a very serious limitation on the broadcaster’s freedom of expression in that it places the broadcaster at the mercy of the signal carrier licensee.