44 S.C. 128\02 Constitutions of many Commonwealth countries, including the Constitution of Zimbabwe, explicitly provide for derogation of a fundamental right. Such derogation has to be in terms of the law that satisfies the criteria I have referred to earlier on. Apart from satisfying the said criteria such law must also be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. What is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society is elusive of a precise definition.20 In its determination of what is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society the court has to bear in mind that there is always the presumption of constitutionality in favour of legislation. Thus in Zimbabwe Township Developers (Pvt) Ltd v Lou’s Shoes (Pvt) Ltd 1983 (2) ZLR 376 GEORGES CJ (as he then was) had this to say at pp 382E – 383F:- “We were referred to the case of Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramesh Mootoo (1974) 28 WIR 304 in which the matter was canvassed by HYATALI CJ. He cited from a number of cases which in my view indicates the process plainly. Thus in Crowell v Benson (1931) 285 US 22 at 62 HUGHES CJ stated: ‘When the validity of an Act of congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’ Again in Black on The Construction and Interpretation of Laws (1911) p 110 para 41H is cited as follows: ‘Every Act of the legislature is presumed to be valid and constitutional until the contrary is shown. All doubts are resolved in favour of the validity of the Act. If it is fairly and reasonably open to more than one construction, that construction will be adopted which will reconcile the 20 Woods & Ors 1994 (2) ZLR 195 at 195B-C