Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum External constitutional experts, including the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, were invited to advise on the final drafting, but did not receive the draft and thus could not comment effectively.xii The final drafting was overseen by the Attorney-General notwithstanding public complaint about his partisan role and conflicts of interest. There were reports that the CC had been infiltrated by the Central Intelligence Organisation and that Zanu-PF was boycotting the CC.xiii Zanu-PF submitted its own constitutional proposals, which included the retention of an executive presidency limited to two six-year terms of office and the recreation of the post of prime minister. Both appeared in the final draft against majority public opinion. The recommendations of the CC’s own committee on transitional mechanisms were rejected, namely that previous terms of presidential office under any former constitution should be counted as part of the total terms allowed and that the current State President should resign.xiv The CC ended its work in a bitter dispute in its final plenary session over its proposals to restructure the executive organs of state. Twenty-four commissioners, including two Zanu-PF MPs and the only opposition party member to join the CC,xv rejected the final draft. They also unsuccessfully petitioned President Mugabe to do likewise. The final draft proposed to reintroduce a prime minister, to be appointed by an executive president. The outcry that the views of the public had been ignored, even discarded, was deafening, in all, including state-owned, media. The final draft proposals contained 282 clauses categorised into 18 Chapters and five Schedules. They included statements of intent to govern policy, a declaration of ‘Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms’ (together with their limitations and enforcement mechanisms), citizenship, executive, legislative and judicial functions (with a separate chapter on the Attorney-General), the public services, uniformed services, independent commissions, a ‘public protector’ (replacing the Ombudsman), financial control, local government, and traditional leadership. Publicly-reported rejection of the draft was very widespread. Members of the public complained that they had not seen what they were being asked to endorse, and criticised the CC for its partisan stance in pushing for acceptance of its own work in publicity backed by well-known Zanu-PF members and supporters. The CC’s life was extended in early Decemberxvi so that it could wind up its affairs but contrary to this mandate, it mounted a very expensive advertising blitz for a ‘yes’ vote. One openly racist advertisement used photographs published in the Daily News of a white couple in ‘Vote NO’ teeshirts. CC meetings were regularly disrupted by disaffected people, reportedly sympathetic to the NCA and opposition parties. The coalition of women’s organisations said it would be unable to recommend support for the draft without substantial changes to its provisions for women’s equality. Reaction from a wide range of Christian churches was also negative. Morgan Mabuto, head of the Zimbabwean chapter of Amnesty International, criticised the draft constitution for its human rights defects, including the retention of the death penalty, its failure to incorporate international treaty and convention obligations already ratified, and its silence on torture perpetrated by law enforcers. The NCA collected 5 000 signatures against the draft and then drafted an alternative new constitution based on submissions it had received. Despite some demand to do so, it did not release this draft before the referendum, but continued its reform-oriented process after the referendum. Zanu-PF promoted the draft constitution (and later fought the general election) on an anti-colonial ticket which was widely felt to be inappropriate and nationally divisive 20 years after Independence. Much of the ruling party’s strategy was predicated on ‘struggle tactics’. They publicly used the language of militarism and war, the mobilisation of a particular faction of (largely unrewarded and unsuccessful) ‘war veterans’ and majibha (supporters of the guerilla armies), threats and infliction of violence, and a resurrection of land ownership as the core dispute over which the liberation 11