Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum Hwange constituencies in Matabeleland North. All three experienced only a few incidents each, presumably of a punitive nature for returning MDC candidates with majorities of at least three to one. Eleven constituencies experienced more post- than pre-election violence. With exception of three Matabeleland North constituencies, they were all urban or peri-urban, and only one returned a Zanu-PF candidate. The one exception was Marondera West, whose newly-elected MP died in a motor accident a few weeks after being elected. The by-election, held on 25-26 November, saw a massive upsurge in violence (including three of the eight post-election killings) as well as reported vote-buying, which caused the MDC to abandon campaigning more than a week before the poll. Nonetheless, the replacement Zanu-PF candidate’s winning margin was reduced by one-third. The election poll ranged between 36,8% in Chipinge South (which returned the only Zanu MP) and 70,6% in Uzumba-Maramba-Pfungwe. In 10 of the 11 constituencies with a turnout exceeding 60%, Zanu-PF took over 70% of the total votes. The one exception was Mutare North, which fell to the MDC with 71,9%. There were high levels of violence in three of these 11 contests, and only Mutare North recorded no incidents of violence. Conclusion The year 2000 saw many different violations of human, as well as political, rights. The muchneeded overhaul of Zimbabwe’s Constitution foundered over basic issues of executive power. The people’s rejection of attempts to extend what they saw as already over-arrogated power led to massive violence, during which human rights were abused on a large scale. Manipulation of the electoral process, including attempts to render monitoring ineffectual, endangered existing political rights. But the results of the election meant that Zanu-PF no longer had the capacity to amend the Constitution without subverting at least eight opposition MPs. In an attempt to win back its earlier two-thirds majority, and control of the Constitution, it has used violence in by-elections similarly as in the general elections. Perhaps Alex Majongwe should be allowed the last word – at least for the moment. ‘While it was generally anticipated that violence would die soon after the elections, the opposite is true. This strategy [is] a forerunner to Presidential elections… This clique expects to rule forever… Tichatonga ksvika madhongi amera nyanga (We will rule until donkeys have horns)… Anyone who dared to question [those who liberate Zimbabwe] would be tagged a sellout. Today, 20 years on, this slogan still reigns supreme. A well-orchestrated plan to silence many voices… Zimbabweans have for many years been misled into believing this is how democracy works, and what happened during this past general election defined the real character of this machinery – intimidation, murder, misinformation, bribery, thuggery, corruption, abusive language, treachery, betrayal, power imposition, terror, etc.’xci xc xci Report of the EU Election Observation Mission on the Parliamentary Elections (unnumbered last three pages). Financial Gazette 17.8.00. 38