In terms of registration, the Electoral Act simply empowers ZEC to, 'appoint persons from time to
time to assist in voter registration.' Who these personscan be is left to anyone's guess. The legal
framework is not transparent enough.It is important to outline that the current voter registration
system is also not viewed by a significant section of the public as transparent, secure and of
integrity. The law is clear that the voters' roll must be free from duplications and multiple entries.
However, from a MPOI-ERC survey, 40% of respondents were of the opinion that the voters' roll is
not free from duplicate and multiple entries. A combined total of 46% of respondents believed
that the voters roll was 'not at all free' from ineligible voters.
Evidence suggests that therewas no uniformityin the application of the rules in 2013.Whilst voter
registration was easy, more accessible and fast in the rural areas, it was more laborious in the
urban areas. Voter registration in practice favored the ruling party's strongholds. The systemic
rural bias in the registration processwas evident in that there was disproportionate distribution
of mobile registration units in the rural areas. The distribution of mobile voter registration units
seems to have been based more on geographic distance than the demographics of Voting Age
Population (VAP) in each constituency. This becomes important in that 40% of respondents in the
MPOI-ERC survey mentioned above said they registered to vote through the mobile registration
units whereas a third (33%) registered through visiting the registration centers. In the same
survey, 57% said they prefer to register via mobile registration units because of accessibility.The
process and system must aim at registering 100% of VAP in line with the principle of
completeness. Once compiled, ZEC has not always made available within reasonable time and in
electronic form the voter register to the public in contradistinction to section 21 of the Electoral
Act. Professionalism, transparency, independence& competence of ZEC must not be
compromised.
The policy framework also inhibits transparency in the chain of custodyin two ways. First, section
70 (3) of the Electoral Act allows with easy the destruction of election materials after the vote. It
reads that, the Chief Elections Officer shall cause to be destroyed all the ballot boxes and sealed
voting materials relating to that constituency not earlier than the fourteenth day after the end of
the election period unless an election petition is lodged in relation to the ward or constituency
concerned. The time period is relatively short and the decision is left to an individual. The easy
with which the law allows destruction of voting materials might be read as a strategy to conceal
some transgressions. The law must not only be transparent but it must be seen to be transparent.
Second, the law is not explicitly clear that the candidates, agents and the public have a right to
inspect or gain access to the voting materials after the election for purposes of verification that
the election indeed reflected the will of the people.As a result, ZEC denied Jameson Timba, a
losing Mt Pleasant constituency candidate in 2013, the right to open the ballot boxes and verify
whether the announced result really matched the voting materials.As this remains fudged in the
law, there is a possibility of a repeat of the Jameson Timba scenario. To establish and maintain
public confidence in the electoral process, results management systems should incorporate the
fundamental international principle of chain of custody and ensure that election materials are not
compromised in movement or storage.
On results management, the policy framework is not clear on how the vertical transmission of
results from polling station to ward, constituency, provincial and national command center
should be monitored.According to regional and international best practice, votes must be
counted and transmitted under public scrutiny at all times with announcement of accurate
results.Zimbabwe's national policy framework is clear that observers, agents and candidates
should provide oversight during counting, verification and collation of results. However,
procedure after counting at polling station does not provide clear room for public oversight. All
is left to the election officer. Section 64 (2) of the Electoral Act stipulates that, immediately after
affixing a polling station return on the outside of the polling station… the presiding officer shall
personally transmit to the constituency elections officer for the constituency to which the polling
station belongs— the ballot box and packets…, accompanied by a statement made by the
presiding officer. The law is silent on the role of candidates, agents, observers and monitors
during the transmission of election results. In addition to election results management and in line
with the global principle of timeliness, tabulating, counting and announcement of results must
always be timely in practice. In the entire election results management, a voter should never be
linked to his or her vote to ensure secrecy of the vote.
Whilst we have largely focused on the national, regional and international fundamental principles
that govern a democratic election are also important to establish and maintain transparency and
citizen confidence in the electoral process, voter registration, voting and results management
systems. We posit 12 fundamental principles, outlining their central objective and applicability in
summary below.
Enhancing Transparency in Zimbabwe's Electoral Processes:
Voter Registration, Voting and Results Management
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