26 reference to the principles outlined above by Lutz(1989); namely, privacy, simplicity, cultural appropriateness, latitude in the evidential burden, access to legal representation, legal aid, and right of appeal. The major area of deficit lies in the specification of rehabilitation for survivors. Nowhere does the Act make reference to a right to rehabilitation, nor does it provide any mechanism for rehabilitation to take place. As we have noted above, rehabilitation may be the only practical redress that a government can offer to the victims of gross human rights violations. It is desirable that compensation be paid, and it would be exemplary if a government were able to compensate survivors for both actual and punitive damages, but this is rarely possible in the real world, and certainly very difficult in a poor country such as Zimbabwe. However, at the least the right to free rehabilitation should be enshrined in the amended Act, with all aspects of rehabilitation - medical, psychological and social - being made available to survivors. This can be practically achieved in Zimbabwe, even in the current climate of cost-recovery and diminished health service delivery. There are examples of how this can be achieved, and the AMANI Trust has provided one small local example to substantiate this.121 Reparation, as compensation and rehabilitation, should nonetheless be the goal, within limits, victims and survivors should be compensated. Indeed, many have already been so compensated, and the government has expended enormous sums doing this. However, the commitment to date is still only a fraction of the need, and does not even address several categories of survivors. Primary victims are the major recipients to date, and there is no possibility under the present Act for secondary victims - families, spouses, or children - to receive compensation. On the data compiled by AMANI from the Mount Darwin programme, we estimate 1 adult in 10 is a survivor, and, extrapolating to the nation, this would mean a very conservative figure of some 50 000 primary victims. This figure could rise by as much as 4 or 5 times if we take into account secondary victims, and this from the Liberation War alone. The figure, if added to by the survivors from the Gukurahundi, begins to beggar description. Furthermore, there is no possibility for redress of the material losses, and these were not inconsiderable. However, it is not beyond the capacity of the nation to offer rehabilitation to the thousands of survivors, and this should be a priority for an amended Act. To provide a legal right to rehabilitation, together with formal, financially-supported access to the health and psycho-social facilities providing this, is a task within the compass of the nation. Reconciliation requires healing, but whether healing alone will be sufficient only time will tell. Truth may be impossible, but redress and rehabilitation are not so. Here an amended War Victims Compensation Act may provide one of the more enlightened pieces of legislation in the history of Zimbabwe. Recommendations: This analysis has suggested certain deficits in the Act, which can be shortly summarised as follows: 1. that the definition of a claimant in terms of the Act can be interpreted restrictively to only include victims of military actions, and exclude survivors of torture and other forms of organised violence; 121 See AMANI(1997), “Survivors of Torture in Mashonaland Central Province: Report and Recommendations”, Harare: AMANI (in preparation).