7 The first two questions have been partially addressed above, especially with reference to the United States and the United Nations Compensation Commission. It seems clear that, in international human rights law, claimants can be both direct and indirect victims, and certainly the United Nations Commission accepts this. Lutz points out that there is little difficulty with direct victims: there is no problem in a person suing for their own torture, as was clearly established in the US case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.10 Here the US court held that, while torture is a violation of international law, it is also a civil wrong for which individuals may sue, and hence allowed relief to the victim’s relatives. The point about who is a victim and what constitutes loss or damage due to torture is an empirical question as well as a legal one, and there is now considerable forensic evidence to demonstrate the effects of torture upon individuals, as well as the families of torture victims. It is now conventional to distinguish between Primary and Secondary victims. Primary victims are those who have directly experienced physical or psychological torture or organised violence, or who have witnessed or been forced to witness torture or organised violence. Secondary victims are those who live with torture survivors, or have lived in situations of epidemic violence. Both Primary and Secondary victims can suffer disorders as a consequence of their experiences. Below we will provide some Zimbabwean material to support the international findings, but it is sufficient at this point to comment that the UN Commission’s view has the general support of most medical scientists working with torture survivors.11 The question of damages is not so simple to resolve. Lutz argues that two classes of claims must be entertained: actual damages or reparation for what was actually lost, as well as punitive damages or damages for the nature or severity of the violation. This involves some brief discussion since the principle of punitive damages is not established in Zimbabwean law. The matter of the actual damage has been discussed recently in respect of human rights violations in Matabeleland and the Midlands in the 1980’s.12 This report based its findings on a survey of the existing case law in Zimbabwe, and the actual costs calculated from a series of case studies, but it does not consider the issue of punitive damages. The notion behind punitive damages is clearly due to the intentional nature of the harm inflicted, which to some extent differentiates torture and inhuman treatment or abuse from other torts or delicts. That torture attracts large damages is welldemonstrated by recent decisions in US courts, dealing with suits under the Alien Tort Statute.13 These cases have shown damages ranging from US$2,707,516 to US$60,004,852, following the landmark case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980. However, the principle of punitive damages for gross violations of human rights has yet to be established in international human rights law, although authorities, such as Lutz(1989) may argue that they are necessary, and this view is supported by others working with torture survivors.14 It is also argued in international human rights law that the victims of human rights violations are entitled to redress from both those who actually caused the injury or suffering and the state. The rationale for making the state responsible lies in the fact that the state is responsible for ensuring that serious human rights violations do not take place. In the Rhodesian state, for example, there was legal responsibility on the government to ensure that security forces and police did not assault or torture citizens, but this responsibility was avoided by the passing of the Indemnity and Compensation Act(1975). Lutz details further reasons for making the state responsible. 10 11 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2dCir.1980). See Espersen & Genefke(1994), “Considerations concerning criteria for financial compensation to victims of torture, Copenhagen: IRCT. See “Breaking the Silence. Building True Peace: A Report on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands. 1980 to 1988, Catholic Commission For Justice And Peace In Zimbabwe & The Legal Resources Foundation, especially Part Three. II. “Legal Damages”. 13 See Lillich (19993), “Damages for Gross Violations of International Human Rights Awarded by US Courts”, HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 15, 207-229. 14 See Espersen & Genefke(1994), “Considerations concerning criteria for financial compensation to victims of torture, Copenhagen: IRCT. 12