This is despite the fact that in Hardwick’s case the argument for the unconstitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy laws was based upon the right to privacy (which is not specifically mentioned in the United States Constitution) and not on the basis of sexual discrimination. Hardwick could not advance a gender discrimination argument precisely because the Georgia Statute was, on its face, gender neutral, that is anal sex was prohibited in terms of the statute in question for heterosexual and homosexual sex. And despite the fact that the Toonen case had accepted the very argument that Chidyausiku JP dismissed. The judgement in the Banana case illustrates the difficulty of attaining change through a reluctant and conservative judiciary, and underscores the need for specific mention of sexual orientation. In summary then, the history of oppression against gays and lesbians together with the inability to attain redress through the political or judicial process indicate that specific mention of sexual orientation is required. Specific mention will prevent the exploitation of any ambiguities or sophistry of equality jurisprudence. It will serve a salutary educative function for our politicians and judiciary who may require specific mention of a group they had found distasteful, before being convinced sexual orientation rights are human rights. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY Like the right to equality, the right to privacy appears in all international and regional rights instruments. Domestically, it appeared in the previous section 11 of our Constitution until removed by Constitutional amendment69. This amendment violated Zimbabwe obligations in terms of Article 2(2) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. The Article requires States to bring their laws into line with the requirements of the Covenant, which are regarded as the very minimum. To amend Zimbabwe’s Constitution to remove a pre-existing right required by the Covenant, is a cynical disregard of Zimbabwe’s obligations. The Zimbabwe government was subjected to sharp criticism on this amendment when it presented its first report to the United Nations under section 40 of the Covenant, which requires a State to show the steps it has taken to bring its law into line with the Covenant. Article 17(1) of the Covenant provides: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights likewise provides: Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. Jurisprudential understanding of what is meant by the right to privacy varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but there is some broad consensus that the right to privacy “embodies a promise that a certain sphere of individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of government” 70. Implicit in this is that a right to privacy has to do with a right to choose and an understanding that certain decisions are properly for the individual to make. Secondly, privacy has a spatial aspect, an understanding that the State may not intrude into certain places without good cause 71. The sort of rights that privacy will protect are those which form “a central part of an individual’s life”. As was stated in the dissenting opinion in Hardwick’s case: 69 No 14 of 1995 70 Justice Blackmun, in Hardwick’s case at p. 154. 71 ibid