Judgment No CCZ 2/14 7 Const. Application No CCZ 78/12 In the premises, I am satisfied that the challenge against the constitutionality of criminal defamation vis-à-vis the rights enshrined in ss 18(1) and 18(9) of the former Constitution is devoid of merit and cannot be upheld. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION There can be no doubt that the freedom of expression, coupled with the corollary right to receive and impart information, is a core value of any democratic society deserving of the utmost legal protection. As such, it is prominently recognised and entrenched in virtually every international and regional human rights instrument. Indeed, at its first session in 1946, through Resolution 59(I) of 14 December 1946, calling for an international conference on freedom of information, the United Nations General Assembly declared that: “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.” This sentiment is echoed with specific reference to the media by the Human Rights Committee (established under Part IV of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1976). In General Comment No. 34, issued at its 102nd session in July 2011, the Committee observed as follows, at para. 13: “A free, uncensored and unhindered press or other media is essential in any society to ensure freedom of opinion and expression and the enjoyment of other Covenant rights. It constitutes one of the cornerstones of a democratic society. The Covenant embraces a right whereby the media may receive information on the basis of which it can carry out its function. The free communication of information and ideas about public and political issues between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is essential. This implies a free press and other media able to comment on public issues without censorship or restraint and to inform public opinion. The public also has a corresponding right to receive media output.”